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COMMENTS
ORGANIZED CRIME AND INSULATED
VIOLENCE: FEDERAL LIABILITY FOR
ILLEGAL CONDUCT IN THE
WITNESS PROTECTION
PROGRAM
The Mob is being squeezed. From within, old age and illness are weakening its
tiredfamily bosses; impatient younger Mafiosi are killing each other in their brutal
reach for power. From without, federal and state authorities seem to be putting
aside old rivalries to gang up on the gangsters in a new drive to put their leaders
behind bars .... I
I. INTRODUCTION
Success in the government's new push against "La Cosa Nos-
tra" will require a heightened dependence on "inside" information,
provided by first-hand witnesses to organized criminal activity.2
All citizens, including insiders, have a duty to testify on civil or
criminal matters when required by law.3 Not even the threat of
death is a legal excuse not to testify.4 Yet historically, fear of repri-
1 Hard Days for the Mafia: The Feds Turn the Screws, TIME, March 4, 1985, at 25.
2 Id. at 28 ("mobsters worried about informants who might cooperate with prosecu-
tors to lessen their own penalties").
3 Courts ofjustice are entitled to "every man's evidence." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). According to Professor Wigmore, the duty
to testify when directed by a court to do so comes as an "indispensable element of civi-
lized life," one necessary for the preservation of law and order. Id. at 72-73.
The sole exception to this canon exists in the several testimonial privileges granted
by law. Historically, the right not to testify as to matters within one's knowledge could
be granted when courts perceived that a relationship society wished to foster could be
damaged by forced disclosure. Id. § 2285, at 527. Generally, however, the threat to the
relationship had to exceed society's need for information before the privilege would be
granted. Id. Privileges between attorneys and clients, physicians and patients, clergy-
men and penitents, and husbands and wives have been recognized on this basis. See
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL.
L. REV. 101 (1956). For the classical formulation of the factors which should govern
creation of a testimonial privilege, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 at 527.
4 Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1960).
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sal has deterred many would-be informants from providing informa-
tion to law enforcement authorities,5  particularly when the
information has concerned organized crime.6
Since 1970, the Justice Department's Witness Protection Pro-
gram (hereinafter "WPP"), 7 has provided an important testimonial
incentive to persons with knowledge of criminal conduct of interest
to the government. Established by Tide V of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970,8 the WPP authorizes9 the Attorney General to
5 See, e.g., United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1979) (cocaine dealer
refused to tell grand jury of source, for fear of reprisal); United States v. Patrick, 542
F.2d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (threatened reprisal did
not excuse witness from duty to testify about associate's gambling activities). A report
by the Department ofJustice's Criminal Division has noted that:
Because discouraging witnesses with the use of violence is such an effective tool for
neutralizing law enforcement, the most cruel and inhuman torture before death is
not uncommon. Those suspected of cooperating with law enforcement officials
have been beaten, burned, blown up, shot, drowned, and/or garrotted. The hits are
typically well-planned and executed by professionals who leave few traces, and on
the rare occasion where there are witnesses, as soon as the word goes out that it was
a mob hit, the witnesses become very reticent ...
U.S. DEPT. OF JusTicE, WrrNEss SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW COMM. REPORT, DRAFr 7,
reprinted in Witness Protection Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 276 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as 1978 Hearings].
6 The likelihood of reprisal against those who testify is uncertain. CompareJ. ALBINI,
THE AMERICAN MAFIA 267-69 (1971) (a participant in organized crime will probably be
killed for revealing facts which "might be legally devastating to important syndicate par-
ticipants .. " Exceptions occur when social conditions, including the likelihood of a
police crack-down, warrant against it) with F. IANNI & E. REUSS-IANI, A FAMILY BUSINESS
146-49 (1972) (study of one Italian-American crime family revealed no use of "coercive
sanctions" for violations of secrecy). See also United States v. Mastrangelo, 662 F.2d 946,
949 (2nd Cir. 1981) cert denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1982) (government witness killed on his
way to testify about drug importation).
7 The Witness Protection Program is also called the Witness Security Program
(WSP), or WITSEC.
8 Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 501-04, 84 Stat. 922, 933-34, repealed by Continuing Appro-
priations, 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, §§ 1207-10, 98 Stat. 1837,
2153-63. Original authorization for the WPP is reprinted at 18 U.S.C. prec. § 3481
(1976).
9 18 U.S.C. prec. § 3481 (1976) read in full:
Sec. 501. The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to provide
for the security of Government witnesses, potential Government witnesses, and the
families of Government witnesses and potential witnesses in legal proceedings
against any person alleged to have participated in an organized criminal activity.
Sec. 502. The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to rent,
purchase, modify, or remodel protected housing facilities and to otherwise offer to
provide for the health, safety, and welfare of witnesses and persons intended to be
called as Government witnesses, and the families of witnesses and persons intended
to be called as Government witnesses in legal proceedings instituted against any
person alleged to have participated in an organized criminal activity whenever, in
his judgment, testimony from, or willingness to testify by, such a witness would
place his life or person, or the life or person of a member of his family or house-
hold, in jeopardy. Any person availing himself of an offer by the Attorney General
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provide witnesses with short-term or permanent protection. Such
protection may include 24-hour supervision, or outright relocation.
Under the program, witnesses and their families have received
wholly new identities, credit card and work histories, and indefinite
subsistence payments. Between 1970 and 1983, over 4,000 wit-
nesses and 8,000 family members entered the program.10 With an-
nual program costs in excess of $30.9 million," the WPP currently
is regarded as an indispensible tool in federal organized crime fight-
ing efforts.' 2
to use such facilities may continue to use such facilities for as long as the Attorney
General determines the jeopardy to his life or person continues.
Sec. 503. As used in this title, "Government" means the United States, any
State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or
possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department
agency, or instrumentality thereof. The offer of facilities to witnesses may be condi-
tioned by the Attorney General upon reimbursement in whole or in part to the
United States by any State or any political subdivision, or any department, agency,
or instrumentality thereof of the cost of maintaining and protecting such witnesses.
Sec. 504. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time
such funds as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.
10 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, CHANGES NEEDED IN WITNESS SE-
CURITY PROGRAM, 8 (1983), [hereinafter cited as GAO Report], reprinted in Hearings on
H.R. 7309 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the
House Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982
House Hearings].




Fiscal Year Admitted (millions)
1970-73 647 NA












Telephone interview with Jerry Bullock, Public Affairs Office, United States Marshals
Service (Mar. 15, 1985); telephone interview with Bill Dempsey, Public Affairs Office,
United States Marshals Service (Sept. 20, 1985).
12 H.R. REP. No. 767, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 n.1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984
House Report]. "In general, the contribution of these [government witnesses] to the war
on organized crime cannot be overestimated .. " Witness Security Program: Hearings
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation of the Senate Comm. on the Governmental Affairs,
96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1980) (opening statement of Sen. Nunn) [hereinafter cited as
1980 Senate Hearings]. In recent years, protected witnesses with personal histories in
[Vol. 76210
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Yet society has paid a heavy price for the WPP's successes.
While maximizing witness security by removing witnesses from their
previous lives, the program has also given witnesses a chance to es-
cape existing civil or criminal obligations. Specifically, the WPP has
enabled divorced witnesses to keep their new identities from
spouses. Many witnesses consequently have violated standing cus-
tody or visitation decrees, depriving former spouses of all access to
their children for several years.13 Furthermore, as a rule the WPP
has placed witnesses in communities across the country without al-
erting state and local officials to the witnesses' personal history, or
even their presence. Many protected witnesses are themselves
criminals, 14 and have committed new crimes after their admission to
the WPP, including murder.15
This Comment examines the accomplishments of the WPP to
date and argues that the courts and the Department of Justice have
struck an improper balance in weighing a witness' right to protec-
tion with the security interests of society. To an extent, an inherent
tension must exist between the rights of a protected witness and the
surrounding community: the anonymity that increases a witness'
safety from reprisal necessarily diminishes access to a witness for
law-abiding persons as well. WPP officials, however, consistently
have made decisions to admit and shield witnesses without attempt-
ing to enforce child custody and visitation obligations, and without
evaluating a witness' credibility or threat of harm. 16 Numerous citi-
organized crime have credited the program both for saving and refocusing their lives.
See 1980 Senate Hearings at 6 ("The program is super. Based on what it is designed to do,
it does it well. It's designed to keep people alive and give them a new start in life, and it
accomplishes this program in a damn good fashion.") (statement of anonymous wit-
ness). It is estimated that 10,000 criminals have been convicted as a result of testimony
provided by federally protected witnesses. Moreover, these criminals have received
sentences two times longer than those of defendants in similar cases without protected
witness testimony. See Coates, Another Bad Apple Sours Image of Witness Protection Program,
Chicago Tribune, Mar. 2, 1986, at 8, col. 5.
13 See infra notes 170-98 and accompanying text.
14 See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 255 (statement of Howard Safir, Assistant
Director for Operations U.S. Marshals Service) ("When it [the program] was originally
constructed it was designed primarily for those people who were involved in criminal
activity and it is not structured for non-criminal people. . . . [Any non-criminal] who
would come into this program . . . would find considerable trauma .. ") Id. Over
95% of all WPP witnesses have criminal records. Id. at 280. In fact, some are released
from current prison terms and are given protection in exchange for inside testimony.
See infra notes 134-51 and accompanying text.
15 Between 1978 and 1982, 200 witnesses in the WPP were rearrested on new crimi-
nal charges. See GAO Report 17, reprinted in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 318.
Protected witnesses have committed 10 murders since the program's start. See 1984
House Report, supra note 12, at 28 n.23.
16 See, generally Part III, infra.
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zens have sued the federal government for injuries suffered at the
hands of WPP witnesses;' 7 courts repeatedly have found, however,
that federal decisions concerning the selection and protection of
witnesses are discretionary acts for which the government cannot be
liable.18 Often, these courts have misconstrued the breadth of gov-
ernment discretion, and wrongly removed an important means for
suing the government for its negligent acts.
This Comment posits that the WPP can operate effectively with-
out the unlimited freedom traditionally enjoyed by both administra-
tors and witnesses. Indeed, in October 1984, Congress recognized
the need to control WPP excesses by passing the first legislative re-
form of the program in its history. 19
Part I of this Comment examines the history and structure of
the WPP, emphasizing the numerous administrative problems which
have contributed to failures in protection and selection. Part II con-
siders the suitability of the Federal Tort Claims Act as a means of
imposing federal liability in the WPP. Part III examines the courts'
extraordinary deference to the government in the WPP, by consid-
ering cases in which federal actions have been challenged. Part IV
considers the strengths and limitations of the new federal statute
governing the WPP-the Witness Security Reform Act of 1984 - 20
as a means of correcting the balance between the rights of protected
witnesses and the community at large.
This Comment contends that an equitable WPP must include
the mandatory assessment of a witness' risk to a community before
admission to the program; must hold witnesses to all their existing
civil obligations; and must impose liability on the federal govern-
ment when its negligent administration of the WPP allows protected
persons to commit illegal acts. These reforms would preserve soci-
ety's legitimate interest in controlled access to a protected witness,
without significantly damaging the governmental interest in inside
information.
I. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE WPP
A. ORIGINAL PROGRAM FORMATION
Long before the formation of a centralized witness protection
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
20 Continuing Appropriations, 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
§§ 1207-10, 98 Stat. 1837, 2153-63. The Witness Security Reform Act is Congress' pre-
ferred means of referring to Title XII, part F, subpart A of the massive FY 1985 continu-
ing appropriations law.
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program, federal investigators recognized organized crime's capac-
ity to "eliminate anyone who stands in the way of its success and
destroy anyone who betrays its secrets." 21 For decades, however,
federal officials made only erratic, ad hoc attempts to protect
threatened witnesses. The Department of Justice developed a vari-
ety of means to safeguard witnesses, including many in use today,22
but no formal standards existed to determine the kind of witness
who would be eligible, or the kind or duration of services to be pro-
vided. This absence of structure deterred23 and inconvenienced 24
would-be witnesses.
The 1967 Task Force on Organized Crime25 declared that ex-
isting provisions for protection inadequately protected witnesses
from reprisal. 26 The Task Force urged Congress to create residen-
tial facilities, or "safe houses," for the protection of witnesses; wit-
nesses desiring such protection could live at such a federal
residence while the organized crime litigation was pending.27 Con-
gressional legislation addressing the Commission's proposal passed
without debate in 1970.28
In addition to the "safe houses" urged by the Task Force, Title
V of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act empowered the Attor-
ney General to "otherwise provide for the health, safety, and wel-
21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, REPORT OF THE WITNESS SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW
COMM. DRAFT 3, reprinted in 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 272 (findings of the Kefauver
Committee).
22 "The assistance varied and included arranging for relocation to a new residence,
assisting in establishing a new identity, or obtaining employment. Often, the assistance
was little more than a bus ticket to some distant location." GAO Report 5, reprinted in
1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 306. State and local officials relocated witnesses as
well, working both with and apart from the Department ofJustice. Id.
23 Commentators on Senate Bill 30, the legislation that served as the foundation for
the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act, noted that the certainty of a witness' safety
directly affected the odds that the witness would testify. See Organized Crime Control:
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
430 (1970) (statement of Aaron M. Kohn, U.S. Chamber of Commerce [hereinafter cited
as 1970 Hearings]); id. at 496 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, American Civil Liberties
Union).
24 Id. at 430 (statement of Aaron M. Kohn, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). In 1962,
the Justice Department protected one witness by transporting him to the Canal Zone.
25 The Task Force on Organized Crime was established by President Lyndon John-
son's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice.
26 U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUsTICE, REPORT OF THE WITNESS SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW
COMM. DRAFT 4, reprinted in 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 273.
27 Id.
28 Senate Bill 30, the proposed Organized Crime Control Act, was introduced by
Sen.John McClellan (D-Ark.) onJanuary 15, 1969. F. GRAHAM, THE ALIAS PROGRAM 43,
44 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4007.
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fare" of all protected witnesses.2 9 Until 1984, this clause provided
the sole statutory authority for the re-identification of witnesses.30
Ironically, two factors suggest that Congress' grant of such
broad authority to the WPP was inadvertent. First, Title V was a
seemingly innocuous measure, lost amidst other more controversial
reforms contained in the OCCA. These other sections of the legis-
lation received extensive debate. 1 Second, as originally drafted,
the Act only permitted creation of the temporary residential facili-
ties.32 The bill's sponsor acceded to a private Justice Department
request to broaden the WPP's authority several months after the
bill's introduction.3 3 The Justice Department, however, did not tell
Congress how this change would affect the WPP at the time of the
Act's passage.3 4
As passed, Title V of the OCCA authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to "rent, purchase, or construct protected housing facilities and
to otherwise offer to provide for the health, safety, and welfare" of
witnesses.3 5 Persons eligible for protection were those whom the
government intended to call as witnesses in proceedings against
persons "alleged to have participated in organized criminal activ-
ity."'3 6 Families of witnesses also were eligible for protection. Both
the offer and acceptance of protection was voluntary. The only pre-
condition for an offer of protection was the judgment of the Attor-
29 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 502, 84 Stat. 933.
30 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31 See GRAHAM, supra note 28, at 44. The Organized Crime Control Act also pro-
posed changes in the inquisitorial powers of grand juries, increased penalties for habit-
ual offenders, and reduced witness freedom from self-incrimination. See generally H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4007-91.
32 Similar facilities previously had been used by the Department of State to debrief
defectors and agents. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE WITNESS SECURITY PRO-
GRAM REVIEW COMM. DRAr 5, reprinted in 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 274; GRAHAM,
supra note 28, at 43.
33 In the spring of 1969, Sen. McClellan received a letter from then Attorney General
John Mitchell requesting that funds be given to the Department ofJustice "for the care
and protection of such witnesses, to be used in whatever manner is deemed most useful
under the special circumstances of each case." GRAHAM, supra note 28, at 43. The De-
partment wrote the text which was added to the bill. Id.
34 Attorney General Mitchell informed a committee of the House of Representatives
in May 1970 that the change would enable the Department of Justice to relocate and
provide jobs for witnesses. Id. at 44. One observer of the WPP concluded that Congress
remained unaware of the Justice Department's program for renaming witnesses until
1973. Id. at 44-45. "[I]n many ways, [the WPP] represented a culmination of abuses
within the executive branch that only reached their apex in the Nixon administration;
excessive secrecy, deception, contempt for Congress, institutionalized lying, and bu-
reaucratic arrogance." Id. at 45.
35 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 501, 84 Stat. 933.
36 Id.
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ney General that the lives "or person(s) of the witness, his family, or
his household were jeopardized by the witness' willingness to tes-
tify."13 7 Once begun, protection could be continued as long as the
Attorney General determined that risk existed.38
The Justice Department adopted few administrative procedures
for the WPP in the first years after the Act's passage.3 9 These estab-
lished an admissions process for the program,40 and described mini-
mum background information to be required of all new entrants. 4 1
Such background information included general personal informa-
tion about a prospective witness' name, number of family members,
employment, and criminal history. It provided standards for mea-
suring the value of a witness to the Justice Department. These stan-
dards required a description of the significance of the witness' case;
a summary of the testimony; and a listing of other prospective wit-
nesses. 42 The purpose of collecting data was to enable the Depart-
ment ofJustice to decide if "it would be advantageous to the federal
interest" for protection to be offerred. 43 The Justice Department
37 Id. Confining the WPP to voluntary participants was the sole recommendation
made by commentators in congressional hearings on S. 30. See 1970 Hearings, supra note
23, at 496 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, American Civil Liberties Union).
38 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 502, 84 Stat. 933. In 1975, a Justice Department manual
further specified that a witness had to be "essential [to] a specific case that is important
in the administration of criminal justice" to be accepted. U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-
9-21.100, in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 259.
39 U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Justice Department Order OBD 2110.2: Witness Protection
Maintenance Policy and Procedures (Jan. 10, 1975) [hereinafter Justice Order OBD
2110.2], reprinted in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 284.
40 Authority to request government witness protection was entrusted to one of three
persons: the U.S. Attorney for the district in which the witness resided; an Assistant
Attorney General from either the criminal or civil division of the Justice Department
(depending on the case at trial); and a designee of the Assistant Attorney General. Id.,
reprinted in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 285-86.
41 Id.; U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9- 9-21.400 (April 16, 1981), reprinted in 1982 House
Hearings, supra note 10, at 261-63.
42 Requests for admission were required to contain information in 13 separate areas
relating to the candidate: the witness' name, address, date and place of birth, and police
record; the importance of the case, as measured by power of the illegal organization and
the suspect on trial; a summary of the testimony to be provided by the witness; determi-
nation of the degree of threat posed to the witness, including the names of suspects;
names, dates and places of birth, and relationship to the witness of all other persons
recommended for relocation; a full listing of a witness' assets and liabilities, including
real and personal property, debts, alimony, and child support orders; preliminary inter-
views of the witness and family; an estimate of each trial date in which the witness would
be asked to appear; names of other individuals to whom protection would be offered;
medical problems experienced by the witness or family; parole restrictions; employment
history; and likely subsistence needs. Id.;Justice Order OBD 2110.2, reprinted in 1982 House
Hearings, supra note 10, at 285-86.
4 3 Justice Order OBD 2110.2, reprinted in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 285. The
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did not address the effect of protection on other interests, including
those of communities to which witnesses would be sent.
B. GROWTH AND CHANGE IN WPP DESIGN
An increase in the number of program entrants 44 forced limited
structural reforms on the WPP in the first years following its crea-
tion, particularly in the provision of witness services. Three reforms
are especially noteworthy: the replacement of temporary "safe
houses" with permanent relocation;45 creation of a protection bu-
reaucracy to meet witness needs; 46 and the required preparation of
a memorandum between government and witness, enumerating a
new entrant's rights and duties in the WPP.4 7 While clarifying the
extent of the government's responsibility to protected witnesses,
these reforms did little to enforce witnesses' responsibilities to per-
sons outside the program.
Replacement of Safe Houses. From their inception, safehouses
were criticized because they required continued monitoring and
servicing, and because they had the effect of incarcerating witnesses
and their families for the duration of protection.48 Further, by ex-
posing witnesses to each other, safehouses increased the likelihood
of government probes being disclosed without authorization.49
As an alternative to safehouses, nondescript government-
purchased housing gradually became the preferred means by which
WPP witnesses were protected. Instead of guarding witnesses to en-
sure their safety, WPP officials "hid" witnesses by minimizing the
government's contact with them.50 This change in policy increased
witnesses' freedom of movement; at the same time, it damaged the
government's ability to detect and prevent illicit witness conduct.
Creation of WPP Bureaucracy. Subjecting witnesses to live with
Justice Department Order assigns responsibility for determining a witness' eligibility to
the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. Id. at 286.
44 See supra note 11.
45 See infra note 48-50 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
47 See infra note 55-61 and accompanying text.
48 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 91 (statement of William E. Hall, Director, U.S.
Marshals Service).
49 Id.
50 According to one Assistant U.S. Attorney, even the role of a federal agent assigned
to a witness is limited.
[B]asically [the agents] find them a place to live and the people are on their own.
It's (not) as if you have (an agent) ... hanging out at the home or something like
that. They just get them set up and leave them alone and then if there is a protec-
tive problem, (the agent is there).
Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 795 (8th Cir. 1982).
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new identities prompted the WPP to expand witness services. An
Office of Enforcement Operations was created to review witness
backgrounds prior to admission and to schedule witness appear-
ances at trial.5 ' Responsibility for the daily protection of witnesses
was entrusted to the United States Marshals Service (USMS). 52
Gradually, marshals and their deputies received training in law, psy-
chology, and counseling to help witnesses adjust to their new
lives. 53 Notwithstanding this training, USMS agents often remained
unwilling to perform their newly-assigned tasks. 54
Memorandum of Understanding. In the WPP's early years, wit-
nesses commonly received misleading or unauthorized promises
from federal agents, often in an overzealous attempt to elicit testi-
mony.55 In 1977, a Justice Department committee recommended
the introduction of a standardized memorandum as the sole means
of communicating federal responsibilities to witnesses. 56 The re-
sulting Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)-one drafted by the
Justice Department and signed by each protected witness prior to
admisson-stipulated such things as the witness' agreement to ac-
cept a name change,57 and the government's willingness to pay sub-
sistence income 58 and assist the witness' job search.59 The MOU
also informed witnesses of two forms of proscribed behavior that
51 GAO Report 11, reprinted in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 312.
52 In 1973, 28 C.F.R. § 0.111 (c) was adopted to instruct the Marshals Service Direc-
tor to make "[p]rovision[s] for the health, safety and welfare of government witnesses
and their families pursuant to §§ 501-504 of Pub. L. 91-452". 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(c)
(1982).
53 Marshals Service specialists receive training in courses ranging from bomb identi-
fication to stress management at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in
Glynco, Georgia. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 204-13 (reproduction of training
school curriculum).
54 For example, beginning in 1975 Justice Department guidelines required USMS
agents to help identify potential job opportunities for protected witnesses. See infra note
123. The program's early years, however, were marked by instances in which this duty
was ignored. Id. Similarly, USMS agents commonly failed to visit protected witnesses in
their homes, despite their promises to do so. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
55 U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, REPORT OF THE WiTNESS SECURITY PROGRAM REvIEw COMM.
DRAFr 47, reprinted in 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 316.
56 Id.
57 See 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 234, 250.
58 Id. at 235.
59 Acquisition of gainful employment is the responsibility of the protected witness.
EACH WITNESS IS EXPECTED TO ACQUIRE EMPLOYMENT WITHIN SIXTY (60)
DAYS FOLLOWING HIS OR HER PERMANENT RELOCATION. The United States
Marshals Service will assist the witness in attempting to locate one job opportunity.
The United States Marshals Service can give no assurance that a job opportunity
which may be located, will be equal to the witness' last job in either type, prestige,
or pay. . . . If the witness fails to accept this job opportunity, he or she will be
terminated from subsistence.
Id. at 237 (emphasis in original).
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would jeopardize their inclusion in the WPP. First, the United
States refused to "shield" witnesses from the claims of creditors; all
witnesses had to settle civil obligations in advance of entrance. 60
Second, criminal conduct or other "wilful acts" endangering witness
security after admission subjected the witness to automatic WPP
termination. 6'
Although laudable, the MOU suffered from a lack of enforce-
ability. The document was neither codified nor incorporated into
federal regulations. Justice officials emphasized that its terms did
not constitute a contract with a witness. 62 Consequently, enforce-
ment of the MOU required the cooperation of individual WPP
agents; when they were unable or unwilling to invoke the MOU to
enforce a witness' civic duties, an outside party could do little.
63
C. ADEQUACY OF EXISTING WPP DESIGN
Until 1984, the above reforms of the WPP failed to provide effi-
cient internal management, harmonious relations with other gov-
ernment agencies, or satisfactory witness services. 64 These failures
60 "Arrangements must be made with creditors immediately, to settle all debts. Fail-
ure to do so will jeopardize participation in the Witness Protection Program since the
United States Marshals Service WILL NOT SHIELD witnesses from legitimate creditors.
Failure to settle debts may result in the disclosure of location to creditors." Id. at 236
(emphasis in original) (other emphasis omitted).
61 Wilful acts on the part of the witness or family members, which jeopardize the
witness' security, WILL BE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION... since the Marshals
Service will be unable to provide adequate protection. Such actions as. . . involve-
ment in criminal activity will result in IMMEDIATE TERMINATION from the Wit-
ness Protection Program. Likewise, the United States Marshals Service WILL NOT
SHIELD witnesses from civil or criminal litigation initiated prior to or subsequent to
entry into the Program.
Id. at 233 (emphasis in original).
62 In a November 1982 letter to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-Wis.), Associate
Attorney General Rudolph W. Giuliani stressed that imposing a contractual relationship
between a protected witness and the government, "whereby the witness would agree to
provide testimony in return for program services and financial assistance" would be a
violation of law. See 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 220 (letter from Assoc. Attor-
ney General Giuliani). The law cited by Giuliani, 18 U.S.C. § 201(h), proscribes graft
and bribery among public officials, in general, and prohibits the payment or promise of
anything of value "for or because of the testimony . . . to be given by [a] person as a
witness . . ." in particular. 18 U.S.C. § 201(h) (1977). Giuliani has characterized the
WPP's services and payments to witnesses as being incidental to and not in exchange for
witness testimony. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 220.
63 In Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d 687 (1st Cir. 1981), for
example, the court found no federal liability when the government refused to provide a
plaintiff with a witness' new identity, so that the plaintiff could collect a $5,000 debt. For
further discussion of Melo-Tone, see infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
64 For a general criticism of the program's recent administration, see U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, WITNESS SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW COMM. REPORT, DRAFT AND COM-
MENTS, reprinted in 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 256.
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had direct and indirect bearing on the WPP's ability to enforce wit-
nesses' civic duties.
1. Direct Effects
Ambivalence of U.S. Marshals. A tension emerged between policy-
makers and implementers of the WPP, due to long-standing organi-
zational divisions in the program's administrative office, the United
States Marshals Service (USMS). Determining the services to be
promised witnesses in the MOU, and other program formulation,
rests with a Chief of Witness Security, appointed by the Attorney
General. 65 Yet historically, only a small proportion of USMS per-
sonnel assigned to the protection of witnesses have answered to this
official. 66 Most USMS agents are deputy marshals, working under a
U.S. marshal whom the President appoints to a four-year term.67 By
law, U.S. marshals can supplement these deputies with untrained as-
sistants, known as "contact deputies." U.S. marshals also have au-
thority to veto the witness security chief's placement of a relocated
witness in their district.68 Witness oversight falters from the use of
untrained staff and conflicting lines of authority.6 9
State and Local Governments. Despite the large proportion of for-
mer criminals in the WPP, the program has never required that state
or local officials be notified that witnesses are to be placed in their
communities.70 According to WPP policy, "necessary security pre-
cautions preclude. . . notification of local law enforcement authori-
ties of the presence of protected witnesses within their
jurisdiction...unless and until it appears that the witness has become
involved in an illegal activity."'' T Theoretically, this policy permits
USMS officials to share witness information with local officials after
any alleged illegal act. In practice, however, local officials are noti-
65 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 91-94 (statement of William E. Hall, Director,
United States Marshals Service).
66 It was estimated in 1980 that 65 percent of the WPP's field personnel were outside
the control of the Chief of Witness Security. 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 48
(statement of Gregory Baldwin, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations).
67 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 561-62 (1977). Every U.S. marshal retains jurisdiction for one
judicial district in the United States. Id. § 561.
68 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 48 (statement of Gregory Baldwin). It has
been observed that "the U.S. marshal often functions as an entirely separate entity re-
sponsible basically to no one." Id.
69 Even trained deputy marshals have a reputation for laxness. In the WPP's early
days, one witness' identity was jeopardized when he was booked by his deputy marshal
into a hotel run by the Mafia; the deputy marshal casually mentioned the witness' iden-
tity to an undercover federal agent, posing as a prostitute. Id. at 56.





fled only "when a witness is arrested and his fingerprints are sent to
the FBI for identification. ' 72  Consequently, local officials must
request FBI assistance to learn about the criminal past of a suspi-
cious person. Otherwise, federal agents are free to decide when,
and if, to contact local officials about the background of a criminal
suspect.73
2. Indirect Effects
To the extent that the WPP has failed to fulfill witnesses' expec-
tations for new jobs, homes, and security, it has encouraged their
discontent, and may have contributed to many witnesses' subse-
quent illegal acts. Employment, for example, is one means of dis-
couraging witness crime. 74 Yet witnesses rarely get help finding
work before they have completed their testimony, and many have
been unemployed for years. 75 Under WPP rules, witnesses must ac-
cept available jobs or lose financial assistance from the program, re-
gardless of their interest in the work found. 76 Additionally, in the
72 Id. The FBI provides the WPP background information on witnesses with criminal
records. It also is the agency primarily responsible for divulging witness' criminal
records with state officials. Justice Department regulations require all adult WPP partici-
pants to be fingerprinted upon their entry into the program. These prints are kept on
file with witnesses' prior criminal histories. If a protected witness later becomes a sus-
pect in an investigation, and fingerprints are requested from the FBI, that agency noti-
fies the USMS, which also provides state agents with additional information relevant to
their investigation. Id. at 218.
73 See, e.g., infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
74 See S. REP. No. 300, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1981) ("Finding employment is the
most essential objective the successfully relocated witness must realize.").
75 One relocated witness recounted that
When it came down to employment, I was constantly asking, because we were told
again when we started the program. . . that I would have to have ajob in 90 days,
joining the program. . . . After almost [two] years, I was still asking the marshals,
'When are we going to start looking for a job?' They said, 'We don't want to get
you a job until you testify, because we don't want you taking time off from work to
go testify.'
1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 73-74 (testimony of Gary Haak).
76 The relocated witness, appearing to have been born yesterday. . . cannot inde-
pendently seek any type of worthwhile employment in our sophisticated society. He
must accept what the marshals service can find for him. . . . Normally, some me-
nial-type job can be found for the witness. One difficulty is the fact that many [crim-
inal witnesses lack] legitimate job skills. . . . [S]ome witnesses are highly educated
and formerly held high-salaried, responsible positions. The Marshals Service has
neither the expertise, the flexibility, nor the funds to effectively assist witnesses in
these broad categories.
Id. at 10 (testimony of Gregory Baldwin and Raymond Worsham, Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations). The WPP maintains a "Headquarters Employment
Assistance Section." This office was established to develop national contacts with em-
ployers willing to hire protected witnesses. Id. at 259-60 (testimony of Howard Safir,
Director for Operations, USMS). In 1980, however, this office had only three staff posi-
tions, two of which had been vacant for six months. Id. at 263.
[Vol. 76220
WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
WPP's first years, overzealous deputy marshals made exaggerated
promises about rewards, like new homes, that witnesses could ex-
pect. Rarely were these promises met.77 Introduction of the MOU
has partially alleviated this problem. 78
III. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR WITNESSES' ILLEGAL ACTS
Placement in the WPP automatically insulates a witness from his
or her prior responsibilities. Serious questions arise regarding the
federal government's responsibility when witnesses abuse their new-
found freedom by violating the law. Witnesses typically hide behind
their new identities in three situations: when evading debtor re-
sponsibilities; when evading state court orders governing child cus-
tody and visitation; and when commiting violent crimes. 79 At issue
in all three situations is whether the government should be made
liable to third parties for its failure to foresee the effect of a witness'
admission to the program, or its failure to ensure a witness' compli-
ance with the law while in the program. In response to this ques-
tion, courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to the extent of
government responsibility and liability for witnesses' illegal acts.
A. CIVIL JUDGMENTS WITHIN THE WPP
Since the country's inception, America's courts have abided by
the principle that a sovereign body cannot be sued without its con-
sent.8 0 Yet because this doctrine has little basis in the words of the
77 Commenting on informal assurances he allegedly received before entering the
WPP, one witness has noted that:
I was told that my family and I would initially be placed in a hotel in the city to
which we would be relocated. The stay in the hotel was to be very brief ... We
stayed there for approximately two months .... Although I had been told ... my
contact Marshal in my place of relocation would help me find another place to live
so that we could get out of the motel, this never happened. In fact, my wife and I
finally had to go out and find our own place to rent ... without any assistance from
our Marshal.
Id. at 64 (testimony of Gary Haak).
78 See text accompanying infra note 237. Notwithstanding its unenforceability, the
mere existence of the MOU has served to curb the promises made and expectations
placed in the WPP. For an examination of the effect of Congress' 1984 reforms on the
WPP's management, see generally infra, Part IV.
79 See generally infra, Part IV, and notes and accompanying text.
80 See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("It is inher-
ent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without
his consent") (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court's first formal recognition of sov-
ereign immunity came in United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834). In Nichols
v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1869), the court declared the doctrine "fun-
damental" to the performance of governmental duties, but offered little elaboration as
to why this was the case. Id. An "element of faith" acceptance of the sovereign immu-
nity rule was also espoused by the Court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) ("It
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Constitution,8 1 Congress and the Supreme Court periodically have
challenged and limited the doctrine of sovereign immunity.8 2
By the Act of February 24, 1855,83 Congress first gave courts
authority to determine money damages for citizens injured by fed-
eral conduct.8 4 This and later modifying statutes,8 5 however, were
only jurisdictional; they created neither a right to sue the United
States nor a right to money damages, even for alleged constitutional
violations.8 6 Plaintiffs had to rely on a specific provision of federal
law mandating compensation to receive a court judgment.8 7
The absence of a provision authorizing compensation in the
WPP helped defeat creditors' attempts to sue the federal govern-
ment for money owed by debtors in the program. In Melo-Tone Vend-
ing, Inc. v. United States,88 the First Circuit upheld a declaratory
judgment against a creditor seeking to recover a loan made to a gov-
ernment witness prior to his protection. The court rejected argu-
ments that the WPP had created a "direct and foreseeable
is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the rule .... It is enough
for us to declare its existence.").
81 The Constitution granted the federal judiciary power over all "Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution the Laws of the United States, . .. [and] to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a party .... U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution bar suits in federal court, without con-
sent, against "one of the United States by Citizens of another State .. " U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
82 See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 (1980) (sovereign im-
munity called a "somewhat arid fountainhead"). In Owen, the Court noted that
it has never been understood how the doctrine of sovereign immunity came to be
adopted in the American democracy. . . . [The doctrine] was never completely ac-
cepted by the courts, its underlying principle being deemed contrary to the basic
concept of the law of torts that liability follows negligence, as well as foreign to the
spirit of the constitutional guarantee that every person is entitled to a legal remedy
for injuries he may receive in his person or property ...
Id. at 645-46 n.28.
83 Ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
84 The act created a Court of Claims to "hear and determine all claims founded upon
any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States .. " Id. § 1.
85 Originally, the Court of Claims' decisions were subject to the approval of Con-
gress. The 1887 Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1977))
gave the Court of Claims the power of law but explicitly confined its jurisdiction to con-
tract, admiralty, and other disputes not sounding in tort. See 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING
FEDERAL TORT CLAiMs, § 53 at 2-9 to 2-14, § 54 at 2-15 to 2-17 (1984).
86 The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits any taking of
"private property. . . for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution or the language of a
statute or regulation must specifically mandate compensation before a cause of action
for money damages will lie. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 401-02 (1976).
87 Testan, 424 U.S. at 402.
88 666 F.2d 687 (lst. Cir. 1981).
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interference" with the appellant's property, 89 and that the WPP's
refusal to reimburse the loan or divulge the debtor's whereabouts
constituted an unlawful taking.90 The court found that the WPP had
only inconvenienced, not removed, appellant's right to property.91
Furthermore, neither the WPP's authorizing statute, nor any other
statute required compensation for injury or loss resulting from the
WPP's administration. 92 The absence of a WPP provision permit-
ting money damages for uncompensated takings continues to ob-
struct creditors' attempts to recover from protected witnesses. 93
B. TORT SUITS WITHIN THE WPP
Tortious conduct by WPP officials is more susceptible to suit
than the kind of conduct addressed in Melo-Tone. In the 1946 Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA),94 Congress gave citizens a right to sue
the United States, "in the same manner and to the same extent as a
89 Id. at 689.
90 Id. at 688.
91 "Mhe governmental action here was not directed at or toward the plaintiff's
property right, and any interference with that right ... is at most an indirect conse-
quence of the exercise of lawful governmental power." Id. at 689.
92 Id. at 690.
93 The plaintiff in Melo-Tone did not attempt to sue the WPP for breaching its Memo-
randum of Understanding with the witness. That document required entering witnesses
to settle debts before entering the WPP, and warned that the government could expose
to creditors those witnesses failing to do so. See supra note 60. The Memorandum was
neither a statute nor a formal regulation and it did not mandate compensation to credi-
tors in the event of breach. Further, the document provided that "no agency relation-
ship" existed between the witness and the WPP in settlement of a witness' debts. The
program "assume[d] no responsibility for expenses incurred in concluding these ar-
rangements." 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 240. Thus, breach of the MOU alone could
not have been a basis for a claim in Melo-Tone.
The Memorandum of Understanding became statutorily required in 1984. See infra
note 239 and accompanying text. At this time, it is unknown whether the document will
eventually contain new language, and whether it will specifically mandate compensation
to creditors. Telephone interview with Gerald Elston, attorney, Office of General Coun-
sel, United States Marshals Service, March 15, 1985; see also infra notes 240-41 and ac-
companying text.
94 Act of August 2, 1946, Chapter 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (principally contained in
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1976 and supp. IV 1980)). The FTCA replaced Con-
gress' previous practice of permitting citizens relief from governmental agents' torts
only through private bills and statutes authorizing relief in isolated fields of law. For
example, the Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 843, authorized the Secretary of Agriculture
"to reimburse owners of horses, vehicles, and other equipment lost, damaged, or de-
stroyed while being used for necessary fire fighting .. " The Act ofJuly 11, 1919, 41
Stat. 109, allowed the Army to settle claims not exceeding $250 for "damages to persons
and private property resulting from the operation of aircraft at home and abroad." See
generally 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs § 55 at 2-18 to 2-45 (1984). Pri-
vate relief bills were plagued by an absence of uniformity and neglect of precedent:
similar types of claims often received opposite treatments in successive Congresses. See
I L.JAYSON, § 66.03 at 3-10, 3-11.
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private individual under like circumstances" could be sued, for the
negligent or wrongful acts of its employees.95 Exempted from tort
liability, however, were all acts of government employees
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise orperformance or the failure to exercise orperform a discretionary function
or duty on a part of the federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.9 6
Determining the breadth of the "discretionary function exemp-
tion" is critical to courts' finding government tort liability in the
WPP. Yet despite several Supreme Court cases defining the exemp-
tion,97 consistent standards do not exist to distinguish discretionary
acts from negligent, actionable ones.98 Generally, Congress in-
tended the FTCA to make federal actors accountable for conduct
exceeding permissible limits of policy; Congress did not intend to
allow citizens to use the FTCA to test the validity of policymaking
itself.99
The distinction between policymaking and policy implementa-
tion is often unclear, however. Government agents may act under
general authority which requires them to make subjective decisions
after considering unique sets of facts. These decisions may them-
selves be governed by informal rules, unique to an agency. Amidst
uncertainty, courts have employed one of four different tests to de-
termine the degree of discretion permitted in a given act. These can
be thought of as the "absolutist," "due care," "statutory authority,"
and "post discretion" tests of governmental discretion. Almost
without exception, the test granting government agents the greatest
discretion, the "absolutist" test, has governed courts' evaluation of
negligent federal conduct in the WPP.
95 Act of August 2, 1946, supra note 94, at 60 Stat. 844, § 410(a). The United States
is liable for injuries caused by "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or ommission occurred."
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1977). The "law of the place" clause requires a plaintiff to show an
alleged tortious act under federal statute, or the tort law in a given state. Judgments
stemming from the Act generally serve as a complete bar to any further action by a
claimant. 28 U.S.C. § 2676.
96 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
97 See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
98 For a commentary on courts' varying interpretations of the exemption, see Blessing
v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also Dupree v. United States, 247
F.2d 819, 825 (3d Cir. 1957) (FTCA "confusing" in meaning and application); Her-
nandez v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 369, 370 (D. Hawaii 1953) (meaning "not crystal
clear.").
99 See I L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs § 71 at 3-24.
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1. The "absolutist" interpretation
The Supreme Court first interpreted the reach of the discre-
tionary function exemption in Dalehite v. United States.100 Dalehite ad-
dressed the personal injury claims of several hundred people, killed
or injured by an explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The ex-
plosion occurred as the fertilizer was being shipped to Europe as
part of the American foreign aid program following World War II.
The Court found that decisions regarding the packaging and ship-
ment of the fertilizer were policy related. Consequently, neither the
shipment's planners, nor the lower government agents who manu-
ally carried out the plans, were subject to liability.' 0 ' Federal immu-
nity, the Court found, extended beyond an initial decision to pursue
a course of action, and included all "determinations made by execu-
tives or administrators in establishing plans [or] specifications."'' 0 2
Under an absolutist reading of Dalehite, the government should
be exempt from liability for any policy decisions, and acts carrying
them out, that have not been statutorily barred. As long as govern-
mental policy is being implemented, the theory goes, a government
agent cannot be subject to tort liability. Several courts addressing
alleged negligence in the WPP have adopted such a view.' 0 3 Alter-
native interpretations of Dalehite, however, have been premised on
the theory that some element of choice accompanies nearly every
act.' 0 4 Courts espousing this view have addressed the reasonable-
ness and "due care" present in a governmental action as well as its
relationship to policy.
2. The "due care" test
The Supreme Court helped introduce the "due care" test in In-
dian Towing Co. v. United States.' 0 5 Indian Towing addressed the claims
100 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
101 Lower-level planners approved procedures which resulted in the volatile material
being stored at too high a temperature and shipped without combustion experiments or
proper warning labels. Id. at 38-44.
102 Id. at 35-36. "Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is dis-
cretion." Id.
103 See infra notes 147-51 & 175-82 and accompanying text.
104 As one court has commented,
Most conscious acts of any person whether he works for the government or not,
involve choice. Unless government officials ...make their choices by flipping
coins, their acts involve discretion in making decisions. ...
If the Tort Claims Act is to have the corpuscular vitality to cover anything more
than automobile accidents in which government officials were driving, the federal
courts must reject an absolutist interpretation of Dalehite. ...
Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1967).
105 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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of a plaintiff whose ship was damaged by the Coast Guard's failure
to maintain a local lighthouse. The Coast Guard acknowledged that
it had failed to implement policy; nonetheless, the agency sought to
avoid tort liability on grounds that the FTCA did not reach to gov-
ernment acts which private individuals did not perform.' 0 6 Re-
jecting this argument, the Court held that the FTCA imposed a duty
upon federal agencies to behave as a private person would, regard-
less of the uniqueness of a governmental function.' 07 The Coast
Guard, like a private person, could thus be held to a standard of due
care.' 08 Though not explicitly overruling Dalehite, Indian Towing
refocuses government actors' liability upon a reasonable person
standard and away from an actor's exercise of authorized discretion.
3. "Statutory authority" test
Functions performed under a statute or regulation expressly
giving employees discretion to act generally are placed within the
discretionary function exemption.' 0 9 Often, the exemption will be
permitted by courts even in the absence of express statutory lan-
guage. Some jurisdictions, for example, exempt government
agents from FTCA liability if an agency is authorized by law to act
"as [it] shall determine." 110
4. The "'post-discretion" test
In a final, fourth test, courts occasionally invoke FTCA liability
on grounds that the negligence of federal employees has occurred
after the exercise of discretionary planning."' In Logue v. United
States," 12 for example, the decision to remove a suicidal federal pris-
oner from a hospital to a county jail, where he subsequently killed
106 Id. at 64.
107 The Court found that the "hornbook tort law [requires] ... one who undertakes to
warn the public of danger ... to perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner,
even when such an act is performed only by government officials." Id. at 64-65.
108 Id. at 69.
109 See, e.g., Newberg v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Ill.
1970) (statute authorizing agency discretionary purchase of saving and loan association
assets barred FTCA liability for unnecessary purchase).
110 See Blaber v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. N.Y. 1962), afd, 332 F.2d 629
(2d Cir. 1964) (Atomic Energy Commission, vested with authority to act "as the Com-
mission shall determine," not liable for negligent nuclear components manufacturing).
111 See, e.g., Logue v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 459 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1972), reh'g denied, 463 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated
on other grounds, 412 U.S. 521 (prison guard responsible for negligently supervising sui-
cidal prisoner); Hambleton v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Wash. 1949), rev'don
other grounds, 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950) (Army sergeant responsible for emotional
distress caused by overzealous interrogation).
112 334 F. Supp. at 322.
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himself, was found to be discretionary. The court found, however,
that the federal agent lacked discretion with respect to guarding the
prisoner; the agent's failure to provide reasonable care to prevent a
second suicide attempt was held to be actionable.1 13
Courts possess considerable flexibility through these four rival
tests to determine the scope of the discretionary function in the
WPP. Usually, however, they have chosen to adopt an absolutist
reading of Dalehite, and have immunized all official acts conducted
by agents in the program. 114 Courts have interpreted the WPP's
sparse authorizing language to give U.S. agents broad discretion to
decide not only how to protect witnesses, but also to whom protec-
tion may be offered. The negligent discretionary decisions of agents
- decisions, for example, not to enforce existing custody decrees or
not to warn local communities of a witness' presence - have been
exempted from liability, regardless of the lack of wisdom and care
with which they were made." 15
IV. FEDERAL DISCRETION IN THE WPP
A. WITNESSES' COMMISSION OF CRIMES
Courts' deference to governmental discretion in the face of wit-
nesses' illegal acts is well illustrated by an Eighth Circuit decision,
Bergmann v. United States. 1 6 In Bergmann, the USMS admitted Benja-
min Rosado and his family into the WPP, so that Rosado might tes-
tify against underworld figures. Rosado's personal criminal record
was long and well known to the assistant U.S. attorney requesting
his protection. 1 7 Nonetheless, the Justice Department found that
Rosado met the agency's minimal requirements for WPP admis-
sion."18 The USMS soon changed Rosado's name, relocated him, 19
and provided him with all necessary documentation; the USMS,
113 Id. at 325.
114 See infra notes 147-51 & 175 and accompanying text.
115 Reliance on non-absolutist interpretations of Dalehite could have led to opposite
conclusions. Under the Indian Towing "due care" test, individual agents' performances
would simply have been judged according to the duty of a private person under the
same circumstances. Under a "post-discretion" test, WPP agents' protection of particu-
lar witnesses might have been deemed non-discretionary acts occurring after the discre-
tionary WPP decision to protect. A finding of negligence in such a case would expose
the agents to FTCA liability.
116 526 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Mo. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1982).
117 Between 1957 and 1976, Rosado was charged with burglary, car theft, armed and
unarmed robbery, rape, sodomy, incest, and grand larceny. 526 F. Supp. at 446.
118 Specifically, the Department found that Rosado had agreed to be a witness, that
his life appeared to be in immediate danger, and that evidence suggested it was "advan-
tageous" to the government to protect him. Id.
119 Rosado was moved from New York City to St. Charles, Missouri. Id. at 446-47.
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however, neither monitored Rosado's activities in his new city, nor
notified local police of his presence. Three months after his entry
into the WPP, Rosado shot and killed a police officer, Fred Berg-
mann, while commiting a burglary.
The policeman's widow brought a wrongful death action
against the United States government. 120 The district court found
that the USMS was negligent in its failure to protect the outside
community from Rosado and imposed liability under the FTCA. t21
The court held that the WPP's policy formulation concerning the
selection and supervision of witnesses was exempt from liability.' 22
It imposed liability, however, for WPP agents' acts which had devi-
ated from informal Justice Department guidelines 123 and plans.' 24
The district court also imposed liability under state tort law 25 for
the government's failure to protect third persons from the poten-
tially harmful acts of parties with whom it had a "special relation-
ship."' 26 The court found that such failure was a "substantial
factor" leading to Bergmann's death.' 27
The district court read the "discretionary function exemption"
narrowly by refusing to apply it to actions inconsistent with informal
120 526 F. Supp. at 443. Rosado was charged and convicted of murder in August
1977. The state court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Id. at 445.
121 Id. at 451.
122 Id. at 450.
123 TheJustice Department WPP guidelines specified that "Ulob assistance, when nec-
essary, will be provided by the Witness Security Division of the U.S. Marshals Service,
but will be limited to assisting the protected person in locating one reasonable job op-
portunity .. " Justice Department Order OBD 2110.2, reprinted in 1982 House Hearings,
supra note 10, at 284. The USMS, however, set up no job interviews for Rosado during
his protection. 526 F. Supp. at 447.
124 A USMS agent testified that he intended to contact Rosado on a weekly basis, but
had failed to do so. 526 F. Supp. at 448.
125 To impose liability under the FTCA, the court had to find the government liable
"in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1977); see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
126 526 F. Supp. at 448-49. Missouri imposes a duty to protect others from the inten-
tional or reckless acts of third persons when "one should realize through facts within his
knowledge or a special relationship that an act or omission exposes someone to an un-
reasonable risk of harm." See Schiebel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B and Comments. Such a "special rela-
tionship" was created when "one... (took) charge of a third person whom he knows or
should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled .. " RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319. The "special relationship" standard has been extended
to federal defendants in several similar cases. See, e.g., Rieser v. District of Columbia,
563 F.2d 462, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (government liable for negligent supervision of mur-
derer on work parole); Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956) (Air Force
released psychotic officer from base hospital).
127 526 F. Supp. at 450.
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government policy. 128 The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, only judged
the USMS's actions according to the WPP's statutory authority and
formal regulations. On this basis, it reversed the lower court. 129
The Eighth Circuit found that the WPP was required to protect only
the witness, not the community. 30 Indeed, it noted, any acts that
increased community security at the expense of the witness might
themselves be violations of the government's discretionary func-
tion. 3 1 The court found that the USMS was not negligent to pre-
sume that Rosado would avoid committing future crimes. Rosado
knew that such conduct would have terminated his protection and
threatened his own life.' 3 2
The Eighth Circuit correctly extended the reach of the discre-
tionary function exemption to include the non-disclosure of
Rosado's name and location to outside parties. The WPP's long-
standing policy had been to withhold witness identities to safeguard
their anonymity, and to include felons in this program as long as
they obeyed the law. Such a program was fully within the govern-
ment's authority and discretion. At the time of his admission, noth-
ing set Rosado apart from other felons in the WPP. Nothing
indicated he was mentally unstable, or otherwise unable to abide by
the standard arrangement made with other felons. It thus was
neither negligent nor an abuse of discretion for USMS authorities to
enroll Rosado into the WPP.
It can be argued that no such discretion should exist where evi-
dence suggests that witnesses are unstable or that their testimony
128 The district court awarded Mrs. Bergmann $69,077.91, applying Missouri statu-
tory law governing damages for medical treatment, funeral expenses, loss of services,
and loss of companionship and consortium. Id. at 451; see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090
(Vernon 1985).
129 689 F.2d at 795.
130 Id. On this ground, the court dismissed the argument that the government had
breached its responsibility to warn outside parties. Id. at 796 ("[I]n the absence of a
statute, there is no legally enforceable duty on the part of the government to warn or
compensate victims of criminal activity.") (citing Redmond v. U.S., 518 F.2d 811, 816
(7th Cir. 1975).
131 689 F.2d at 796. The court downplayed theJustice Department's guidelines re-
quiring employment assistance. The court noted that the witness had ultimate responsi-
bility for obtaining employment. Id. The court also disregarded attempts to correlate
Rosado's unemployment and his crime, noting that Rosado had been receiving about
$1,000 a month in maintenance payments from the government at the time of the Berg-
mann murder.
132 Id. at 797. The court established a test for determining negligence. The test ex-
amined "whether the act of placing Rosado in the program and relocating him with a
new identity increased the risk that [he] would harm another person to a degree which
was unreasonable." Id. The court concluded that any added freedom Rosado was given
to harm an outside party was overcome by the risks he faced in doing so. Id.
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will be unreliable. A second case, Taitt v. United States,133 however,
illustrates some courts' tendency to insulate from liability any
official act performed in the WPP, regardless of its inconsistency
with stated policy, or the existence of evidence of witness instability.
The Taitt case, like Bergmann, involved the murder of an outside
party by a convicted felon formerly in the WPP. What distinguishes
Taitt from Bergmann is evidence suggesting that the Taitt killer was
emotionally unstable,134 and represented a likely threat to third per-
sons at the time of his admission to the WPP. Yet this evidence was
ignored by the USMS from the time the murderer entered the WPP
until he killed his victim, Anthony Taitt.' 35
Taitt's murderer, Marion Albert Pruett, was serving a thirty year
prison sentence' 36 when he agreed to testify about the slaying of his
prison cellmate.137 Pruett's statements helped convict a fellow in-
mate, Allen Benton; 138 they also won Pruett an "unsupervised" pa-
role after a brief hearing before the United States Parole
Commission, 139 and led to Pruett's placement in the WPP.
Pruett and his wife, Michelle, were relocated and given new
names.' 40 Pruett apparently engaged in no new criminal activities
until March 1, 1981. On that date, however, Michelle informed a
local USMS officer, Ruben G. Chavez,14 ' that Pruett had threatened
her life. Michelle disappeared on March 2, 1981;142 her charred
133 No. 83-2142, slip op. (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, No. 83-
2142, slip. op. (10th Cir. Aug. 14, 1985).
134 See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
135 Anthony Taitt, a 21-year old grocery clerk in Loveland, Colorado, was killed at
work on the night of October 16, 1981. Six months earlier, his murderer had left the
WPP voluntarily following his implication in another crime. See infra note 144 and ac-
companying text.
136 Pruett initially was sentenced to 15 years in prison for bank robbery in 1971.
While on "furlough" in 1975, he was arrested for armed robbery and received a second
15-year term. Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142, slip op. at I (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1983).
137 William Rhett Zambito was murdered on March 3, 1978. According to U.S. Attor-
neys' records, after agreeing to testify Pruett was placed in an "emergency protection"
program within the prison from May 1978 until he testified in August 1979. Pruett was
paroled September 15, 1979. See Brief for Appellees at 7-9, Taitt v. United States, No.
83-2142 (transcript of July 1, 1983 hearing, and conversation between Judge Richard
Matsch and Assistant U.S. Attorney John Barksdale).
138 See United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1981).
139 Pruett has stated that his parole hearing lasted "about five minutes or ten min-
utes." Brief for Appellant at 13 n.8, Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142 (quoting Pruett
Deposition at 130).
140 Pruett and his wife were moved to Rio Rancho, New Mexico and given the names
Charles "Sonny" and Michelle Lynn Pearson.
141 Chavez was a deputy United States Marshal. Upon receiving Michelle Pearson's
March 1 phone call, he made an appointment to see her on March 3.
142 See Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142, slip op. at 2; (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1983).
Papers Indicate Pruett Boasted Of Killing Second Wife, Her Lover, Rocky Mountain News, Jan.
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body was found in the desert on April 17.143 Local police detained
Pruett over the next three days in connection with Michelle's death,
and Ruben Chavez told them of Michelle's fear of Pruett. Chavez,
however, said nothing of Pruett's status as a felon or protected wit-
ness. 144 Consequently, the police released Pruett for insufficient ev-
idence. He quickly quit the WPP on his own volition, left town, and
began a spree of four murders, including that of Anthony Taitt. 145
Pruett subsequently confessed to having killed his wife.' 46
In August 1983, federal district courtJudge Richard Matsch dis-
missed a suit by Taitt's parents alleging that the government had
acted negligently in admitting Pruett into the WPP. The suit also
alleged that the WPP had been negligent in failing to act upon no-
tice of the threats to Michelle's life, in failing to advise local sheriffs
of Pruett's background before or after Michelle's death, and in fail-
ing to provide the parole commission with adequate information
about Pruett's emotional instability, prior to his release from
prison. 147 Matsch gave "complete discretion" to the Justice Depart-
ment to decide "when, to whom, how and for how long to provide
protection."'148 The judge found it "difficult to believe" that, had
local officials known of Pruett's criminal and WPP record, they
would have linked him to Michelle's killing. 149 Even if local officials
could have drawn such a link, Matsch ruled, federal agents were en-
titled to FTCA immunity whenever they had to "perform[] ... statu-
tory duties ... without reliance upon a fixed or readily ascertainable
standard."' 50 No such ascertainable standards governed the WPP,
Matsch found.' 5 '
21, 1983; Letter from Ruben G. Chavez, U.S. Marshals Service, to Jerry Ferrara, Sheriff,
Sandoval County (April 20, 1981) (notice of Michelle Pearson's threat).
143 See Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142, slip op. at 2 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1983).
144 Id. In Chavez' April 20 letter to Ferrara, he recalled only that Mrs. Pearson stated
that she felt her husband was going to kill her: "he had mentioned killing her to a girl
friend of hers. . . . I informed her to contact the police department and make a report.
She responded she did not trust the police and she would not contact them." Letter
from Chavez.
145 Pruett Seeking Aid in Suit Filed by Parents of the Victim, Denver Post, Nov. 13, 1982. In
addition to Taitt, Pruett murdered a second Colorado store clerk, and persons in Missis-
sippi and Arkansas after leaving New Mexico.
146 Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 21, 1983.
147 Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142, slip op. at 2 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1983). The
Taitt suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. at 9.
148 Id. at 5.
149 Id. at 7-8. Matsch added that, even if a duty had existed to warn local officials,
Taitt was "a random victim of a continuing course of criminal conduct" whose death was
not a foreseeable consequence of federal neglect. Id. at 8.
150 Id. at 3 (quoting Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1979)).
151 Id. In August 1985, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Matsch's
finding that WPP officials had acted within their discretion when they admitted Pruett
1985]
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Even under its own logic, the district court opinion is flawed,
for the court overlooks several readily ascertainable standards by
which Marshal Chavez's acts could have been measured.
First, Pruett's Memorandum of Understanding, like that of all
WPP entrants, warned that the USMS would not shield him from
criminal or civil litigation "initiated prior to or subsequent to entry
into the program ... "152 Local sheriffs had contacted USMS Mar-
shal Chavez specifically in connection with an investigation that
could have led to Pruett's criminal indictment. Although Chavez
had no duty to report Pruett's threats to his wife while she was alive,
after her murder Chavez clearly disregarded his duty to notify "local
law enforcement authorities of the presence of protected witnesses
[when] it appears that the witness has become involved in an illegal
activity."' 153 Chavez' failure to inform local police of Pruett's back-
ground was directly responsible for his release, and indirectly ena-
bled Pruett to continue his acts of violence. 154
Second, assuming arguendo that the USMS was justified in with-
holding Pruett's history while he was under protection, no justifica-
tion existed for not disclosing this history once Pruett voluntarily
quit the WPP and fled. Even if the WPP's authorizing statute
granted the Justice Department the broadest possible discretion to
protect witnesses, the department possessed no authority to grant a
former witness the special privilege of keeping his status private af-
ter he abruptly left the WPP. 155 Conceivably, disclosing Pruett's
identity upon his quitting the WPP would have prevented Pruett
from completing his shooting spree.
Third, Pruett had a history of psychiatric disturbance, but ap-
parently received little treatment for this illness from prison authori-
ties or the WPP.156 It is unclear whether the Parole Commission
into the WPP. See Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142, slip. op. at 11 (filed Aug. 14,
1985). The Tenth Circuit also agreed that the WPP, and USMS officer Chavez, could
not be held liable for the failure to notify local officials df Pruett's history following the
killing of his wife. Id.
The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed a portion ofJudge Matsch's ruling on other
grounds. Specifically, the appellate court found, among other things, that WPP officials
might have committed tortious acts not protected by the FTCA, if it could be shown that
they failed to provide Pruett's psychological history to the United States Parole Commis-
sion upon request. Id. at 10, 12. The court ruled that Judge Matsch had improperly
granted the motion to dismiss, because he lacked information concerning the WPP's
actions in this area. Id. at 11.
152 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
154 See Brief for Appellants at 35, Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142.
155 Id. at 36.
156 Id. at 14 n.9 (citing Pruett Deposition at 24-33). According to his deposition,
[Vol. 76
WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
knew of Pruett's emotional instability when it had its hearing and
released Pruett from prison.' 57
Finally, it is possible that Pruett's testimony was not only un-
necessary, but also false, and that the government made little in-
quiry into its veracity prior to his WPP admission. Pruett recently
has asserted that he, not Benton, killed his cellmate, and that he
offered perjured testimony at trial.158 According to Pruett, certain
government officials knew of his role in this crime but agreed to
prosecute Benton to block Benton's scheduled release from
prison.' 5 9
Regardless of the truth of Pruett's recantation, it is evident that
the USMS exercised minimal care in its decision to offer Pruett pro-
tection. 60 The recommendation that Pruett be admitted into the
Pruett was diagnosed as needing psychiatric treatment in 1971, but never received treat-
ment thereafter.
In its August 1985 decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that evidence showing the gov-
ernment had negligently administered psychological care to Pruett might serve as an
independent basis for an FTCA claim. Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142, slip op. at 11
(10th Cir., Aug. 14, 1985). Appellants, the Taitts, were subsequently given the opportu-
nity to obtain evidence to make such a showing.
157 Judge Matsch, in his August 1983 Memorandum Opinion, dismissed the Tailt case
without knowing whether the Parole Commission had requested or received information
about Pruett's mental history, prior to its decision to release him. See Taitt v. United
States, No. 83-2142, slip. op. at 5-7 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1983).
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed this portion of'Judge Matsch's decision. The
Tenth Circuit concluded that dismissal could not occur without learning what informa-
tion the Parole Commission had requested from the WPP. Taitt v. United States, No.
83-2142, slip. op. at 10 (10th Cir., filed Aug. 14, 1985). If the Commission asked for
government records about Pruett's medical history, the WPP's negligent failure to pro-
vide such records could serve as the basis for an FTCA claim, the court concluded. Id.
158 Brief for Appellants at 10 n.7, Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142. At trial, Pruett
reported he was asleep in his cell when Zambito was murdered. United States v. Benton,
637 F.2d at 1055.
159 Pruett testified two agencies (sic) of the FBI... came to him.., and told him
that they would see to it that he go down to the Federal Witness Protection Pro-
gram, if, in fact, he testified that Benton killed Zambito; the reason being, Benton
was about to be released in a year to eighteen months. The government did not
want him released as he was one of the largest cocaine dealers on the East Coast.
Brief for Appellants at 9 n.6, Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142 (quoting Hearing on
Renewed Motion to Dismiss at 7) (statement of Appellants' Attorney AuCoin).
160 If false, Pruett's statement underscores his lack of credibility. If true, the state-
ment may expose federal agents to civil or criminal liability for their part in obtaining
knowingly perjured testimony. Under one federal statute, any person who has "pro-
cured" another to commit perjury can be found guilty of subornation of perjury, and be
subject to both fines and imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1977). See Bivens v. Six Un-
known Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal agents
can be liable in damages for violating commands, when such violation infringes on con-
stitutional rights); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, fed-
eral courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.").
There is reason to believe the jury paid little attention to Pruett's original testimony
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program could have been delayed until a review of his stability and
credibility was complete. The requirement for such a review was
inferable from the WPP's regulatory standard that a witness be "es-
sential . . . in a specific case that is important in the administration
of criminal justice.' 1 61 Such a review, however, was not performed
on Pruett. t62 The district court implicitly held in Taitt that even a
minimum review of a witness' veracity was not required prior to ad-
mission. This holding gave WPP administrators free reign to select
entrants without justification or accountability. Only the most abso-
lutist reading of the reach of the FTCA's discretionary function ex-
emption - one that extends government agents' discretion to
include any acts not specifically barred by statute or formal regula-
tion16 3-could justify such an extreme result. 164
B. WITNESSES' VIOLATION OF CUSTODY/VISITATION ORDERS
When the WPP separates children from a noncustodial parent,
the government's interest in suppressing organized crime is pitted
against a parent's competing claim to the children. Courts have rec-
ognized that noncustodial parents possess some constitutional right
to their children.' 65 Yet the Supreme Court has never clarified the
against Benton, and may have suspected Pruett's personal role in the slaying. Benton
was convicted not of murder, the charge Pruett testified about, but of conspiracy to mur-
der. See Benton, 637 F.2d at 1052.
161 See U.S. AirORNEYS' MANUAL 9-9-2100 in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at
259; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text;.
162 See supra notes 135 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
164 While deputy marshal Chavez should have been found liable for his negligence,
the decision of the Parole Commission to release Pruett to the WPP was not actionable
even though the the board may have had incomplete information on his history. See
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188 (1979) ("the decision as to when a law-
fully sentenced defendant shall actually be released [from prison] has been committed
by Congress, with certain limitations, to the discretion of the Parole Commission.").
Even if the Parole Commission failed to request Pruett's medical records at the time of
its hearing, it relied in good faith on the USMS providing it with an adequate record,
and had authority to act as it did. If, however, the Commission requested but never
received medical records from the USMS, the USMS could be found liable for a negli-
gent act under the FTCA. See supra note 156.
165 The Constitution does not mention specifically the appropriate degree of protec-
tion to which the relationship between a parent and child is entitled. Since 1923, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to protect a parental liberty
interest to one's child. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (arbitrary govern-
ment action may not interfere with liberty interest to establish a home and bring up
children). Such an interest has its source in "intrinsic human rights." Smith v. Organi-
zation of Foster Familes for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as OFFER]. The Court later refined the scope of this liberty interest by recogniz-
ing the importance of a child's companionship to a parent, even when the child was born
out of wedlock. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), reh'g
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protection to which noncustodial parents are entitled. In early cases
involving administration of the WPP, courts gave non-custodial par-
ents little protection against the threat that their children would be
relocated without notice; the relocation was justified as long as it
was rationally related to the WPP's administration, and the wishes of
the protected, custodial parent.' 66 More recently, courts have as-
seited a stronger constitutional interest on behalf of the noncus-
todial parent, one requiring the showing of a compelling
governmental interest.' 67
The status of parents' custodial relationship with their children
similarly has affected their ability to sue the government under the
FTCA for acts damaging their parent-child relationship. Early cases
found that the WPP had unlimited discretion to remove children
from noncustodians in accordance with the custodian's wishes. 168
denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981) (parent's desire for companionship is "an important interest
that. . . 'absent a powerful countervailing interest, [requires] protection.' ") (quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)) (dicta). This right may be less strong when
parental access is impeded than it is when terminated altogether. Dissenting in Lassiter,
Justice Blackmun distinguished the absolute termination of parental access from lesser
forms of impediment, such as reduced or difficult visitation: "A termination of parental
rights is both total and irrevocable. Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the par-
ent with no right to visit or communicate with the child, to participate in. . . any impor-
tant decision affecting the child [] .. " Id. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (interest of unwed father in the companion-
ship of child "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect"); see generally, Note,
The Witness Protection Program: Investigating the Right to Companionship, Due Process, and Pre-
emption, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 431 (1984).
The mere existence of a biological relationship between parent and child does not
trigger a protected parental interest. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 843. The Supreme Court has
suggested that such an interest grows along with the parent's responsibility and support
for the child. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (unwed father deserved
less due process protection when no custodial, personal, or financial relationship was
created); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 918 (1981)
(state may deprive a putative father of authority to approve child's adoption without
violating Due Process Clause, when father has not lived with child but adopting parent
has).
Once a parent has established a relationship with a child, a constitutional protection
exists that is stronger than that for parents never acquiring such a relationship. In
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), for example, the Court found that the state
could remove a child from parental care in response to charges of parental neglect only
with clear and convincing evidence that such neglect existed. Id. at 769. If a "clear and
convincing evidence" test is appropriate for the removal of children from unfit parents,
it is logical to apply an equally stringent standard when state actions separate children
from fit parents. This is the situation in most of the cases involving parent-child separa-
tion in the WPP.
166 See infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
167 See, e.g., Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see infra notes
180-98 and accompanying text; see also Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
168 See infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
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More recently, courts have questioned whether Congress intended
the WPP's discretionary function to extend this far. 169
A 1973 case, Leonhard v. Mitchell170 typifies courts' original def-
erence to the government and custodial parents in the relocation of
children in the WPP. In Leonhard, a divorced father sued to compel
the Justice Department to reveal the location of his three children.
The children's mother and custodian had married an underworld
figure, Pascal Calabrese, who had entered the WPP.' 7 ' Because Le-
onhard was a noncustodian, the department rebuffed his attempts to
discover his children's location through his ex-wife or the official in
contact with her.172 Leonhard subsequently obtained a revised di-
vorce decree from a state court awarding him exclusive custody of
his children; the Justice Department nonetheless rejected his re-
quest a second time. 173
Both the trial and appellate courts rejected Leonhard's manda-
mus suit to compel disclosure. 174 In his first suit, Leonhard alleged
that the relocation of his children without notice constituted a due
process violation. 175 The Second Circuit, however, found that as a
noncustodian, Leonhard had "no clear constitutional right" to cus-
tody or visitation; 176 thus, a rational relationship rather than a com-
pelling interest test determined the constitutionality of the
department's decision.' 77 The court added that the same test al-
lowed the government to continue withholding the children's iden-
169 See, e.g., Franz v. United States, 712 F.2d 1428, 1434-35 (addendum opinion)
(BorkJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 590 F. Supp. at 710-
11.
170 473 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949.
171 The underworld figure accepted federal protection in 1968, prior to the formal
creation of the WPP.
172 Only one Justice Department agent, Thomas Kennelly, was kept informed of the
Leonhard family's whereabouts. Id. at 711.
173 Calabrese reportedly warned his federal contact that if his new family's wherea-
bouts was revealed, "they would move. . . without advising [the contact] of their new
location." Id.
174 Id. at 712. Leonhard sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1962).
175 Id. at 713. Leonhard may have lost his case in the pleadings by arguing that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected him from any governmen-
tal interference in raising his children. Id.
176 The court in Leonhard denied that any parent possessed a constitutional right to
custody or visitation. Id. Even the absolute termination of parent-child access might not
have stirred the Leonhard court to impose a more stringent due process test. One expla-
nation for the court's holding may be that Leonhard preceded several Supreme Court
cases strengthening the due process associated with a parental liberty interest. See supra
notes 161-62.
177 Information possessed by the Justice Department indicated that "murder con-
tracts" had been placed on the heads of Pascal Calabrese, his wife, and her children. In
light of such information, the decision to withhold the family's location was neither
"groundless or irrational." Leonhard, 473 F.2d at 714.
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tity from Leonhard once he became legal custodian, because his
custodial change occurred after the children entered the WPP.178
In a second suit on behalf of his children, 179 Leonhard raised an
FTCA claim stemming from the relocation. Leonhard alleged that
the government had acted negligently in arranging for the children
to live with Calabrese; Calabrese was a dangerous felon, and report-
edly had abused the children during their time with him.180 The
court dismissed Leonhard's FTCA claim on grounds that his ex-
wife, not the government, had exercised her custodial prerogative to
entrust her children to Calabrese.' 8 1 The court added that the gov-
ernment was not responsible for Calabrese's conduct which could
not have been foreseen.' 8 2
In Ruffalo v. Civiletti,'8 3 by contrast, both the Western District of
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit found that a non-custodian had a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in notice prior to the relo-
cation of children by the W'PP. These courts also held that the in-
fringement of such an interest was actionable under the FTCA.'8 4
In Ruffalo, a divorced woman sought the return of her son after he
had been placed with his father in the WPP. The woman based her
claim on the fifth amendment's due process clause, and alleged that
178 The court stated that
Kennelly's present reftisal to disclose the location of the Calabrese family is
grounded in his sense of obligation to them, both because of his agreement never to
disclose their location and of his continued belief that the lives of the children and
[Calabrese and wife] would be endangered if this information should become
known.
Id. The court added, however, that Leonhard was "free, of course, to pursue enforce-
ment of New York's custody order in the courts of that state." Id.
179 In 1975, Leonhard's ex-wife reconsidered her decision to separate Leonhard from
his children, and helped reunite them. In Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981), Leonhard sued federal and local officials on
behalf of the children, alleging that they had been deprived of their constitutional right
to his companionship without a hearing.
180 Leonhard argued that, in consigning his children to the care of Calabrese, who
allegedly "assaulted, battered, [and] deprived [them] of proper care," the Justice De-
partment violated the WPP requirement to "provide for the health, safety, and welfare
of. . . families of witnesses .. " Id. at 622-623; see supra note 9 § 502.
181 "The government did not impose the requirement that the children live with
Calabrese; they were already part of the same family unit .. " 633 F.2d at 625.
182 The court noted that, despite Leonhard's assertion that Calabrese was a convicted
felon, he had no history of child abuse or neglect. Id. This fact distinguished Leonhard
from cases in which the government easily could have foreseen dangerous conduct. Id.
n.39. See, e.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (federal prisoner beaten by
other prisoners); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975) (pilot killed after
FBI rejects hijacker's demands).
183 522 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Mo. 1981), reh'g., 539 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1982), afd
and remanded, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1983), reh'g., 565 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1983),
reviewed sub nom., Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
184 590 F. Supp. at 708-13.
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she had been deprived of a liberty interest without a hearing.1 15
Despite evidence that the woman had cared little for her son prior to
his departure,1 6 the district court ruled that the Constitution re-
quired notice prior to the termination of any parental access to a
child.'8 7
The district court in Ruffalo also found that in some situations,
actions by WPP agents denying a parent's constitutional right will
serve as the basis for a separate FTCA claim. 188 The government
had claimed that the FTCA discretionary function exemption insu-
lated it from any tort liability arising from the deprivation of Mrs.
Ruffalo's visitation rights.18 9 The court found that Congress had
the power to authorize the WPP so as to immunize it from tort liabil-
ity stemming from the termination of parental rights.190 No such
authorization, however, existed in the WPP's originating statute.191
Because the government's decision to prevent visitation violated ex-
isting legal rights created by state courts, 192 an intentional interfer-
ence with those rights was actionable under state tort law and the
185 Under the terms of their divorce, Donna Ruffalo retained legal custody of her
child, while physical possession was assigned to her husband, Michael. Because of her
marked indifference towards her son's welfare, however, the court treated Mrs. Ruffalo
as a non-custodian for purposes of identifying the reach of her constitutional right. See
590 F. Supp. at 710 n.5. As a result, Donna Ruffalo lost her request for her son's return
and was granted visitation instead.
186 "[W]ith Donna's permission or on her initiative, her children have lived with other
individuals, and not with her, for much of their lives." 565 F. Supp. at 36. Furthermore,
evidence suggested that organized crime had paid Donna Ruffalo to instigate the suit to
retrieve her son, in hopes of gaining revenge against her former husband. Id. at 36-37.
187 Ruffalo, 539 F. Supp. at 952. Ruffalo is not the only case to recognize such a right.
See Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979) (noncustodial mother has
constitutional claim to child access).
188 See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
189 Ruffalo, 590 F. Supp. at 710.
190 "[I]f visitation or communication rights were terminated because the marshals
had made a mistaken appraisal of danger, such conduct would not be actionable
under the FTCA. But a wholly unjustified violation of state law rights involves more
than an abuse of discretion, unless it is deemed that Congress intended to grant the
Marshals Service complete authority to override state court orders and all aspects of
parental rights recognized by state law, for any reason or for no reason. I do not
accept such an inference of total preemption.
590 F. Supp. at 710-11. See also 1978 Heaings, supra note 5, at 123 (in which William E.
Hall, Director of the USMS, testified that "I don't think that we would ever want to be in
a posture of telling one parent: 'We have relocated your children; you are out of luck
forever.' ").
191 See Ruffalo, 590 F. Supp. at 710-11.
192 An assistant chief for planning and evaluation of the USMS witness security divi-
sion revealed at trial that the USMS, as a rule, had not required contact between chil-
dren in the program and parents outside the program. Id. at 709. Noting that visitation
rights "almost universal(ly)" were mandated by state law, the court found that the
WPP's admission procedures, defacto, "had the effect of destroying a pre-existing legal
right." Id.
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FTCA,' 9 3 the court held. By insisting that the WPP be administered
pursuant to specific authority, the court in Ruffalo adopted a nonab-
solutist interpretation of the discretionary function exemption.
A third case has challenged the notion that the WPP's original
authorization barred a federal preemption of state custody orders.
In Franz v. United States,'9 4 the District of Columbia Circuit found
that in creating the WPP, Congress intended "the Attorney General
to act, on occasion, in a manner that might be at odds with visitation
rights. . . . Its implementation of the Witness Protection Program
might adversely affect the rights of third parties (such as creditors
and noncustodial parents)."' 9 5 The District of Columbia Circuit,
unlike the Eighth Circuit, found that WPP policy permitted maxi-
mum USMS discretion regarding the relocation of children in the
program.'9 6 The Circuit Court's decision prompted the district
court, on remand, to bar Franz" 9 7 FTCA suit for tortious interfer-
ence with visitation rights.' 98
193 Id. at 711. Missouri and other states have long imposed liability for tortious inter-
ference with custody. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Kramer v.
Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. App. 1982); Kipper v. Vokolek, 546 S.W.2d 521(Mo.
App. 1977); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1983). Few jurisdictions have rec-
ognized similar liability for visitation interference, however. The Vermont Supreme
Court has recognized a cause of action for denying a non-custodial parent "personal
contact or other communication." Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978).
But cf McGrady v. Rosenbaum, 62 Misc. 2d 182, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 181, a f'd, 37 A.D.2d 917,
324 N.Y.S. 2d 876 (1970) (rejection of damage claim for interference with visitation
rights). McGrady is critically examined in Wood, 338 N.W.2d at 125 n.1.
194 526 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983), modified, 712
F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983), remand, 591 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1984). In Franz, a father of
three abruptly lost contact with his children in February 1978, after four years of regular
visitation. 707 F.2d at 589. Franz claimed that by completely severing his non-custodial
relationship with his children, the government had abridged a constitutionally protected
companionship right.
195 712 F.2d at 1429. The majority earlier noted that "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the
Attorney General needed [congressional] authority to effect the kind of incidental, de
facto displacement of state law at issue here, he possessed it." 707 F.2d at 586 n.5.
196 Judge Bork filed a separate opinion in Franz questioning the majority assumption
that Congress intended for the WPP to override state custody or visitation orders. Do-
mestic relations, Bork stated, had "long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province
of the States." Id. at 1435 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)) (Bork, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Bork noted that federal legislation could oust
state law where evidence of congressional intent was explicit, or implicit. The evidence
of intent could be found in pervasive federal regulations in the area, dominance of the
federal interest, or the inconsistency of state and federal law. Id. Bork voted to remand
Franz, in part, to determine fully the extent of Congress' delegation in the WPP.
197 In his addendum statement in the Court of Appeals opinion, Judge Bork ex-
pressed a preference for imposing FTCA liability upon a showing that the law of the
state where the alleged violations occurred, Pennsylvania, recognized a tort of interfer-
ence with visitation rights. 712 F.2d at 1435 (Bork, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
198 "Given the broad range of the duties involved in the administration of the Pro-
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While it precludes suits by non-custodians under the FTCA,
Franz increases the amount of due process protection available to
such a parent. The D.C. Circuit took the position, previously ex-
pressed in Ruffalo,' 9 9 that notice was required prior to the termina-
tion of any parent's access to a child.200 In addition, the court
asserted that a parent's right to a child could not be deprived merely
by the government's assertion of its need to protect a witness and
the child. Rather, the government had to make a "particularized
showing" at the time of protection that "the governmental interest
would be promoted in ways sufficiently substantial to warrant over-
riding basic human liberties." 20 1 Franz eventually was returned to
the district court for consideration of such a showing. 20 2
V. LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF THE WPP
The statutes governing the WPP had not changed in over a dec-
ade as Congress entered its 98th Term. Congress had previously
revealed disenchantment with the program's status quo.203 Two
legislative measures were introduced in 1982, to require the disclo-
gram, a decision to refuse visitation on the basis of the custodial parent's wishes, or the
wishes of the children, is within a federal official's scope of authority." 591 F. Supp. at
380-81.
199 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
200 707 F.2d at 608. The court expressly declined to consider whether a parent had a
right to a hearing when visitation privileges were only temporarily impaired. Id. at 602.
201 Id. at 607. The court did not specify the content or form of such a "particularized
showing." It suggested that each decision to relocate children in the WPP might require
a pre-relocation hearing before a neutral arbitrator to determine the degree of danger a
family would face if noncustodial access were allowed. Id. at 609. For Judge Bork's
critique of this approach, see 712 F.2d at 1440 (Bork, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Bork recognized a procedural due process right to notice, id. at 1438, but found
it inappropriate for his colleagues to do what the Supreme Court had never expressly
done, i.e., assert a noncustodian's substantive right to visit his children. Id. Bork added
that "[tihe government can hardly be expected to make public its case against the leader
of organized crime in advance of his prosecution and to explain what the witness will
testify to and why a conviction is impossible without that testimony." Id. at 1441. Bork's
critique of the majority's opinion was itself attacked by the majority. See id. at 1428-34.
202 Franz v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1984).
203 Congressional hearings have addressed the WPP's efficiency and effectiveness at
least since 1978. See supra notes 5 & 10. Criticisms and legislative proposals have in-
creased in the last four years, however. In 1981, one member of Congress pointedly
attacked the WPP's failure to develop consistent criteria for admission or require psy-
chological evaluations of dangerous entrants. The member also criticized the WPP's
failure to consider a witness' threat to a community or to notify local officials. See 1982
House Hearings, supra note 10, at 28 (testimony of Hon. Virginia Smith). Criticism of the
WPP was not limited to Congress. In a 1982 letter to the parents of a 24-year old man
killed by a protected witness, Associate Attorney General Rudolph W. Giuliani con-
fessed that "frankly . . . in the past, the Department has been too liberal in its intake
policies. As a result, program services may have been extended to witnesses who, for
one or more reasons, simply did not merit such treatment." Id. at 33.
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sure of a witness' identity to local officials in specific settings, 20 4 and
to limit federal agents' immunity from FTCA liability for witnesses'
illegal acts. 205 Neither bill passed. 20 6
In 1984, however, Congress passed legislation that repealed the
WPP's original statutory basis20 7 and reformed most phases of the
WPP's administration. The Witness Security Reform Act 208 pre-
scribed factors to be weighed prior to the admission of any witness;
codified and strengthened the legal force of the Memorandum of
Understanding; strengthened a non-custodial parent's access to
children; and created a Victim's Compensation Fund for families or
victims injured or killed by protected witnesses. 20 9 The law does
204 See H.R. 7039, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 101 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1)(F)
(1982)). The bill required the Attorney General, "upon the request of State or local law
enforcement officials, [to] provide relevant information to such officials concerning a
criminal investigation or proceeding relating to the person protected." Id.
205 See S. 2420, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. §§ 401, 402 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,
2680 (1982)). The measure would have given district courts
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action on a claim against the United States for
damages . . . for personal injury or death directly caused by any dangerous of-
fender charged with or convicted of a federal offense who is released from, or who
escapes from, lawful custody of an employee of, or any person acting as the lawful
agent of, the United States as a result of the gross negligence of such employee or
person.
Id. at § 401(b)(2)(A). Section 402 proposed to withdraw from the FTCA's discretionary
function exception "actions constituting gross negligence for purposes of
[§ 401(b)(2)(A)]." Id. at 402.
206 Senate bill 2420 passed the Senate by voice vote on September 14, 1982. See 128
CONG. REC. S 11439 (1982). The bill contained the FTCA liability revision, and a sepa-
rate title enumerating permissible means by which witness protection could be offered.
See S. 2420 § 202 (creating 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-22). In its own consideration of S. 2420,
the House replaced the Senate's version with one of its own. See Comprehensive Victim
and Witness Protection Assistance Act, 128 CONG. REc. H8212 (1982). This version
strengthened federal law enforcement efforts in areas unrelated to the WPP. For exam-
ple, the bill imposed new criminal penalties for the intimidation and coercion of wit-
nesses. However, the House omitted sections of the Senate bill revising the WPP and
FTCA. Id. The Senate subsequently adopted the House substitute; SenatorJohn Heinz,
one of the Senate bill's original sponsors, acknowledged that its WPP reforms had been
deleted because of their controversy. See 128 CONG. REC. S13062 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1982) (remarks of Senator Heinz). For a general review of the Senate bill's provisions,
see S. REP. No. 582, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
207 Title V of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 501-
04, 84 Stat. 922, 933-34; see supra notes 8-9.
208 Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, part F, subpart A, §§ 1207-10, 98 Stat. 2153-63 (cre-
ating 18 U.S.C §§ 3521-28) (1984). P.L. 98-473 was an omnibus act to continue federal
spending in lieu of appropriation legislation. It was introduced as House Joint Resolu-
tion 648 on September 17, 1984. Congress approved the act on October 10 and 11, and
President Reagan signed it into law on October 12. See 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 34,583-84
(Nov. 21, 1984). The Witness Security Reform Act was added to P.L. 98-473 through a
Senate amendment shortly before it became law. See H.RJ. Res. 648, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S13520, S13538 (1984).
209 An earlier measure, House Bill 4249, the U.S. Marshals Service and Witness Se-
curity Reform Act, passed only the House on May 22, 1984. See H.R. 4249, 98th Cong.,
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not address every valid concern over federal agents' responsibility
for witnesses' illicit acts. 210 Nonetheless, the Act limits government
discretion over the admission and maintenance of protected wit-
nesses. Of equal importance is the fact that the Act exposes the
government to limited liability for witnesses' acts, reflecting con-
gressional awareness of the program's contribution to such acts.
A. PROVISIONS OF THE WITNESS SECURITY REFORM ACT
Admission Procedures. The Attorney General is authorized to pro-
tect and relocate witnesses and their families who are threatened
with violence, intimidation, or other retaliation.211 These condi-
tions expand the WPP's original entrance criteria, which required
that the life or person of a witness or household be jeopardized. 212
The WPP may now protect witnesses testifying about "an organized
criminal activity or other serious offense . .. "213 Officially, the WPP
previously was confined to testimony on organized crime.2 14 The
change in law may enable victims of violent assaults to receive pro-
tection in exchange for testimony.215
The Witness Security Reform Act imposes new duties on the
Justice Department to evaluate both a witness' stability and impor-
tance to a case prior to admission. Before providing protection, the
Attorney General must "to the extent practicable, obtain informa-
tion relating to the suitability of the person for inclusion in the pro-
gram, including the criminal history, if any, and a psychological
2nd Sess. (1984). See also 128 CONG. REC. H4279 (1984). This legislation was largely
identical to the "Witness Security Reform Act."
210 See infra notes 241-52, and accompanying text.
211 The Act permits protection whenever violence, "an offense set forth in Chapt. 73
of [18 U.S.C.]," or a state offense that is similar in nature to either appears likely. Pub.
L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 2153 (1984) (creating 18 U.S.C. 3521 (a)(1)). Chapter
73, which made witness intimidation a federal crime, was enacted in current form in
1982. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503-15 (Supp. 1984).
212 See supra note 9. The changes in the WPP were made to correspond to the U.S.
Code's new sanctions against witness intimidation, see supra note 207.
213 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 2153 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3521(a)(1)) (em-
phasis added).
214 See supra note 9. Even prior to the 1984 reforms, the WPP occasionally accepted
witnesses testifying about matters not officially related to "organized crime." For exam-
ple, during an 18-month period in 1979-80, the WPP admitted 38 persons to testify
specifically about organized crime, and 60 others to testify generally about narcotics,
smuggling, arson, murder, prostitution, and other crimes. GAO Report, reprinted in 1982
House Hearings, supra note 10, at 308. These acts, too, may have been planned by organ-
ized crime; the WPP classifies witnesses according to the purpose of a probe (e.g., arrest-
ing a smuggler vs. identifying syndicate members), not according to the type of criminal
responsible for a given crime.
215 See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
242 [Vol. 76
WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
evaluation, of the person."2 16 The case's seriousness, the risk to
persons and property in the witness' new community, alternative
sources of testimony, and the likelihood that protection "will sub-
stantially infringe upon the relationship between a child who would
be relocated" and a non-relocated parent also must be considered
before admission. 217 Protection is prohibited where the need for a
person's testimony is outweighed by the risk of danger to the
public.218
Disclosure of Witness Identity. The Attorney General may now
"disclose or refuse to disclose the identity or location of the person
relocated or protected," 21 9 after weighing the risk to the witness
from disclosure to the witness against the public benefit from such
disclosure. 220 The Attorney General, however, must comply with
court orders and state or local requests for information -including
a witness' identity, location, criminal records, and fingerprints -
whenever the witness commits a major felony.221 The new law con-
trasts with the original statute, which did not authorize witness dis-
closure at all.2 22
Child Custody. The Witness Security Reform Act does not au-
thorize release of the witness' new identity to a non-relocated par-
ent, but attempts to preserve domestic relationships through other
means. A witness will not be admitted to the WPP where the admis-
sion would destroy an existing parent-child relationship.223 The At-
torney General must bring an action in federal district court to
216 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 2155 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3521(c)).
217 Id.
218 Id. The Act permits temporary protection without such an assessment where the
Attorney General concludes that imminent harm to a witness exists. Id. at 98 Stat. 2156
(creating 18 U.S.C. § 3521(d)(3)). In such an event, the rigid assessment of a witness'
importance must begin "without undue delay after protection." Id. Emergency admis-
sions such as these were common in the WPP even prior to the 1984 reforms. See U.S.
DEPT. oFJU TICE, REPORT OF THE WITNESS SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW COMM. DRA-r 11,
reprinted in 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 280.
219 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 2154 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1)(G)).
220 Id.
221 Id. The Act requires such a disclosure whenever a witness "is under investigation
for or has been arrested for or charged with an offense that is punishable by more than
one year in prison or that is a crime of violence." Id. This provision is a codification of
the Department ofJustice's informal practice of disclosing criminal records to local offi-
cials, upon request. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 411 n.6 (1983), reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3549. As drafted, the section denies state or local
officials any legal right to a witness' history before the witness becomes a suspect in a
new investigation.
222 See supra note 9. The only other standards previously developed for disclosure of a
witness' identity were those placed in the Memorandum of Understanding, see supra
notes 60-61.
223 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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modify a previous custody or visitation order, if the order's per-
formance is "substantially impossible." 224 In such an event, the
court must provide alternative arrangements that are substantially
equivalent to the original rights of the non-relocated parent.225 The
Justice Department must pay all transportation and security costs
for visitation. 22 6
Parents may initiate hearings to alter visitation or custody
under the Act.2 27 Federal district courts are charged with creating
hearing formats which will maximize a witness' privacy and keep a
witness' new identity from a non-custodial parent, if possible. 228
Hearings are to be conducted by mediators, to be followed by arbi-
trators if no resolution has occurred within 60 days. 2 29
Victim Compensation. The Attorney General may now pay restitu-
tion to victims, or families of victims, injured or killed by WPP wit-
nesses. 230 Congress designated one million dollars for the relief of
victims and their families. Relief money is available as a last resort;
a victim first must seek recovery under existing federal or state tort
law. Federal restitution is available only to the extent the victim
224 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 2161 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3524(e)(1)). The
Attorney General must show the impossibility of preserving an existing relationship
through "clear and convincing evidence." Id.
225 "Substantially" equivalent has been found to mean, for example, that an order
providing for four hours of visitation once a week could be replaced by another insuring
one full-day visit each month, in a neutral, safe location. See H.R. REP. No. 767, 98th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 27 (1984).
226 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 2159 (creating 18 U.S.C. §3524(c)). TheJus-
tice Department, however, need not pay for visitation in excess of 30 days a year. Id.
Additional visitation may be paid for by the Department ofJustice in extraordinary cir-
cumstances. The Attorney General has the discretion to provide security on occasions
when visitation is being paid voluntarily by the parent. Id.
227 "[An action to modify [an original custody or visitation] order may be brought by
any party to the court order in the District Court of the District of Columbia or in the
district court for the district in which the child's parent resides who has not been relo-
cated .... ." Pub. L. No. 98-473, §1208, 98 Stat. 2160 (creating 18 U.S.C. §
3524(d)(1)). See also id. at 98 Stat. 2161 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3524(0).
228 Pub. L. No. 98-473, §1208, 98 Stat. 2160 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3524(d)(1).
229 Id. (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3524 (d)(3)). Additionally, the law allows a court to hold
in contempt any protected witness who violates a custody or visitation order. Once held
in contempt, the witness must comply with the court order within 60 days or face termi-
nation of support payments and disclosure of his or her identity to the non-relocated
parent. Id. at 98 Stat. 2160-61 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3524(d)(5)). Notably, the new law's
penalties for violating custody orders do not include the termination of protection. In
this respect the act differs from earlier legislative proposals. See H.R. 4249, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984).
230 The Attorney General may pay restitution to, or in the case of death, compensa-
tion for the death of any victim of a crime that causes or threatens death or serious
bodily injury and that is committed by any person during a period in which that person




"has not otherwise received [damages], including insurance pay-
ments, for the crime involved. ' 23 1 Payments arising from a victim's
death may not exceed $50,000.232 Significantly, a payment under
the Victim Compensation Fund does not constitute federal admis-
sion of culpability for a witness' illegal acts; the law states that the
fund's formation does not create a cause of action against the
United States.233
Settlement of Unpaid Debts. Under the new law, creditors suing
protected witnesses for outstanding debts may serve the witness
through the Justice Department.23 4 Witnesses who fail to comply
with judgments against them risk disclosure of their identities to
creditors. 23 5 Creditors may appeal Justice Department decisions
not to reveal a witness' identity; in such an event, the identity may
instead be shared with a court-appointed agent for the creditor.23 6
Codification of the Memorandum of Understanding. Since 1977, the
Memorandum of Understanding between the USMS and new wit-
nesses has enumerated the limits of the government's commitment
to witnesses entering the WPP.237 The new statute requires for the
first time that such a document be prepared in every instance of wit-
ness protection. 238 The terms of the memorandum required by the
new law resemble those previously found in such documents, i.e.,
the witness must promise to testify, "take all necessary steps to
avoid detection by others . . .," and abide by all laws in exchange
for protection.23 9 However, Congress' placement of the MOU into
statute affects the WPP by narrowing the discretion of USMS agents
responsible for its administration. Because the law now requires
that the federal government specify the form and content of its pro-
tective services prior to a witness' protection, government agents
231 Id. (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3525(c), (d)).
232 Id. Only $25,000 may be recovered for murders occurring prior to the act's pas-
sage; no recovery is available for other crimes committed prior to the law's enactment.
233 Id. (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3525(e)).
234 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 2157 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3523 (a)).
235 Id. The statute states that
[i]f the Attorney General determines that the [witness] has not made reasonable
efforts to comply with the judgment, the Attorney General may, after considering
the danger to the [witness] and upon the request of the person holding the judg-
ment disclose the identity and location of the person to the plaintiff entitled to re-
covery pursuant to the judgment.
Id. A creditor who learns the identity of a protected witness may reveal this identity to
others "only if essential to. . .efforts to recover under the judgment, and only to such
additional persons as is necessary to effect the recovery." Id.
236 Id. at 98 Stat. 2158 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 3523(b)(3)).
237 See iupra notes 59-62 and accompanying text for a full description of the MOU.
238 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 2155 (creating 18 U.S.C. 3521(d)(1)).
239 Id. (creating 18 U.S.C. 3521 (d)(1)(c)).
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have less discretionary authority to deviate from the terms of the
MOU once protection begins. The MOU's codification may provide
more success to plaintiffs using the Federal Tort Claims Act to sue
the government for WPP negligence which contributes to witnesses'
illegal acts. 240
B. ANALYSIS OF THE WITNESS SECURITY REFORM ACT
The Witness Security Reform Act's most significant improve-
ment to the administration of the WPP comes through its required
pre-screening of prospective witnesses. By stipulating that the gov-
ernment assess both the need for a witness' testimony and the risks
of offering protection, the new law ensures an improved process for
selecting both witnesses and cases for which protection will be of-
fered. One consequence of this pre-screening requirement may be
an end to cases like Leonhard. No longer will WPP administrators
have the freedom to assert the privacy of organized crime fighting
at the expense of a family's constitutional right to companionship;
some accommodation of this right will have to be settled in advance
of protection. Another notable achievement of the new law is its
Victim's Compensation Fund. The fund is not an admission of fed-
eral culpability for witnesses' unauthorized acts, but it does recog-
nize the governmental role as an accessory to such acts. 241
At least four issues remain unresolved in the wake of the enact-
ment of the "Witness Security Reform Act," however. All concern
questions central to the administration of the WPP, and warrant
prompt consideration by the program's officials.
First, while the Act asserts the need to preserve family bonds -
and prohibits witness protection from commencing when these
bonds are jeopardized 242 -it provides no mechanism for the airing
of child custody grievances once protection has begun. Under the
law, federal district courts are charged with creating a procedure
allowing protected witnesses to mediate child custody grievances
240 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
241 The House of Representative's Committee Report on H.R. 4249, legislation that
served as the basis for the witness protection provisions of P.L. 98-473, explained one of
Congress' purposes in starting the fund. According to the report, the provision was
included because of
the overwhelming evidence that the federal government has a special and unique
responsibility for the conduct of protected witnesses. [The WPP's ability to rename
and relocate witnesses] frequently serves to hide the protected person's back-
ground from friends, neighbors, and the law enforcement officials in the new com-
munity. Thus, more than in any other case of a Federally supervised offender, the
government has played a role in facilitating the commission of the offense. .. '
H.R. REP. No. 767, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1984) (emphasis added).
242 See supra note 216-17 and accompanying text.
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with non-protected ex-spouses. This procedure is intended to en-
sure communication between the parties, without exposing a pro-
tected witness' location or identity. Courts have already questioned
the feasibility of structuring custodial hearings without damaging
witness anonymity, however.2 43 It shall be difficult for any custodial
hearing or arrangement to be devised which will not expose a wit-
ness' identity at some point in the course of protection.2 44
Second, the new law creates ambiguity in the power given to
state and local governments to obtain witness information. The At-
torney General is newly authorized to disclose a witness' identity to
local officials, after weighing the value and risk of such disclosure. 245
However, state and local officials lack authority to compel disclosure
of witness information, except in connection with specific investiga-
tions or pursuant to court order.2 46 Non-federal officials thus have
an opportunity under the new law to receive witness information
even if a witness is not implicated in an offense under state or local
investigation; they merely need to persuade federal authorities or
the courts of the value of their receiving such information. State or
local officials can be expected to devote increasing efforts towards
making such a showing.2 47
Third, it is unclear whether the WPP will become a common
vehicle for obtaining testimony in cases not involving organized
crime. Congressional drafters of the Witness Security Reform Act
243 See, e.g., Franz, 712 F.2d at 1440 (Bork, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(critique by Judge Bork of the practicability of a hearing which can balance a parent's
constitutional right to a child with the government's need for witness testimony).
244 Even if the mediation and arbitration authorized by the new law are conducted
without exposing a witness' identity, see supra note 229, the WPP must also address the
likelihood that children will readily share a witness' new identity and location with their
non-protected parent.
245 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
247 State and local officials may have had an easier time persuading the Justice Depart-
ment of the need to share witness information prior to passage of the Witness Security
Reform Act. Because the WPP contained so few guidelines and requirements concern-
ing the admission of new witnesses, local officials had justification in questioning the
harmlessness of witnesses placed in their communities. However, the new law's require-
ment that a full assessment of a witness' safety risk precede WPP admission may dimin-
ish the need to exchange witness information. This is because under the new law, a
witness' potential for harm presumably is calculated by the federal government prior to
admission. A witness who passes such federal scrutiny arguably is entitled to the same
privacy from local exposure that ordinary citizens enjoy.
At the same time, the new law does not forbid the admission of witnesses who pose
a threat to a community. It only requires that the value of witness testimony outweigh
the threat to a community. Thus, dangerous persons may still enter the WPP without
local officials' knowledge. Consequently, state and local officials are still justified in
seeking the information needed to prevent such a possibility.
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noted that a witness may be threatened by organized and
nonorganized criminals alike. 248 Temporary relocation, or reloca-
tion without a change of name, might be plausible ways to elicit tes-
timony in several types of non-organized crimes, such as blackmail
or rape.249 It is impossible to gauge the extent to which the promise
of relocation will prompt targets of these offenses to testify. It is
equally unclear whether the WPP can satisfactorily meet its original
purpose, the protection of witnesses in organized criminal cases, as
long as it accepts this new one.
Finally, while federal liability for witness' illegal acts remains
expressly limited by the new law,2 50 the WPP now has statutorily
prescribed standards against which its agents' job performance can
be measured. Courts previously have chosen to exempt WPP agents
from FTCA liability because of the lack of such "ascertainable stan-
dards."'25 ' Now, when a WPP agent fails to complete a psychologi-
cal evaluation of a witness, or admits a witness without preparation
of the Memorandum of Understanding, the barrier to FTCA liability
is removed. 252
Exposing all admission decisions to FTCA liability, of course,
could have a chilling effect on federal agents' use of the WPP. For
example, the Justice Department could discontinue the enrollment
of custodial parents into the WPP, if it feared that non-custodians
would use the FTCA to challenge allegedly negligent decisions af-
fecting existing domestic relations. Whether a particular witness re-
location alters or destroys a familial bond is a judgment call. In
part, success in the WPP depends upon program administrators'
ability to exercise appropriate discretion to make such a call.
Thus, while there remains a need to expose federal agents in
248 [T]here is no reason to deny protection to a witness who is in danger of retalia-
tion, simply because the nexus between the offense and organized criminal activity
is lacking. For instance, a rape victim fearing retaliation from her assailant may not
be willing to testify unless relocation or protection is made available. That a further
assault will subject the attacker to further prosecution is cold comfort in such a
situation. Protection or relocation should be available ...
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3547.
249 Heretofore, the Justice Department rarely has relocated a witness without provid-
ing new identification. Temporary relocation without a name change, however, might
become common practice in rape cases, where an assailant's resources and interests in
pursuing a victim out of town are likely to be less than those of a member of organized
crime.
250 See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text. The new law's $50,000 ceiling on
payments to families of victims falls far short of adequate compensation for many victims
of crime.
251 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
252 Even under an absolutist interpretation of the federal discretionary function, these
would constitute acts contravening explicit statutory requirements.
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the WPP to FTCA liability, Congress should adopt a standard which
preserves governmental tort immunity for conduct arising from fed-
eral agents' ordinary negligence. Specifically, Congress should
amend the WPP's authorization so that federal agents are exposed
to liability for conduct stemming from their gross negligence. A
"gross negligence" liability standard was proposed for the WPP in
Congress in 1982.253 It would expose federal agents to liability only
when their acts signified indifference to their legal duty, and disre-
gard for their legal obligations to third persons.254 Such a standard
would obligate WPP administrators to perform the substantial wit-
ness evaluations now required by statute, even as it reserved them
wide discretion to make admission and protection decisions in light
of these evaluations. At the same time, a "gross negligence" stan-
dard would hold WPP officials responsible for flagrant derelictions
in their now dual duties: consideration of the security interests of
third persons alongside the national interest in challenging organ-
ized crime.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since its creation in 1970, the Witness Protection Program has
had an undeniable, positive impact on federal efforts to expose and
eliminate organized crime. Sadly, however, innocent persons have
had to pay a heavy price for the program's accomplishments. Relo-
cated witnesses, acting under the protection of new identities pro-
vided at government expense, have been able to hide their children
from former spouses in violation of standing child custody decrees.
Witnesses have abrogated their protection arrangements prior to
their own commission of violent crimes. Such illegal acts were natu-
ral by-products of the WPP's poorly-conceived authorizing legisla-
tion. Title V of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act focused
almost exclusively on protecting witnesses from the wrath of organ-
ized criminals. The legislation largely ignored society's need to be
protected from the wrath of the witnesses themselves.
In the wake of Congress' 1984 reform of the WPP, there is rea-
253 See S. 2420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). This
unenacted legislation would have given federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction for
damage claims against the United States, by persons injured as a result of the "grossly
negligent" release of a prisoner from federal custody.
254 See, e.g., Western Mining Corp., Ltd. v. Standard Terminals, 577 F. Supp. 847, 851
(W.D. Pa. 1984) ("gross negligence" is a want of even scant care, but something less
than intentional indifference to consequences); Fidelity Leasing Corp. v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 786, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("gross negligence" is performance
so reckless as to justify a presumption of wantonness); see also PROSSER AND KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 34 (5th ed. 1984).
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son to hope that such tragedies will end. The WPP's new authoriza-
tion for the first time requires federal officials to conduct
psychological testing of prospective witnesses prior to the initiation
of protection. The WPP is required to balance the government's
need for a witness' testimony against the risk which the witness may
pose to family and community. State and local officials possess new
statutory authority to learn the real identities of protected witnesses
upon the commission of a major crime. Such measures, and others,
go far towards crafting a proper balance between the rights of a pro-
tected witness and the security interests of society as a whole.
More remains to be done, however. The agents and adminis-
trators of the WPP continue to possess autonomy and discretion far
in excess of the amount needed to maintain the program. Specifi-
cally, WPP officials continue to retain sole access to witness' true
identities, prior to their commission of crimes. Moreover, WPP offi-
cials may be held accountable only for the limited number of tasks
they are required by law to perform, e.g., performance of psycho-
logical testing prior to witness admission; balancing the costs and
benefits of witness enrollment. Other forms of witness supervision
continue to remain insulated from liability, under the cloak of sover-
eign immunity.
It is true that effective administration of the WPP requires pro-
gram officials to possess some ability to make admission and opera-
tional decisions with impunity. Permitting unlimited claims against
WPP personnel under the Federal Tort Claims Act would have a
chilling effect on the program, and on federal efforts to combat or-
ganized crime.
At a minimum, however, government agents must be made ac-
countable to victims of witnesses' illicit conduct, when such conduct
is the by-product of the agents' gross negligence. Such a standard
would in no way diminish the government's legitimate right to man-
age the WPP without needless encumberance.
A "gross negligence" liability standard, however, does not ap-
pear likely to become part of the Witness Protection Program in the
near future. Until it does, the federal campaign to combat organ-
ized crime will have the ironic and needless effect of creating addi-
tional organized crime victims.
JOSHUA M. LEVIN
250 [Vol. 76
